

THE CONCEPT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY IN THE TRADITIONAL IR
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ABSTRACT

THE CONCEPT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY IN THE TRADITIONAL IR THEORY

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This study focuses on the concept of international society within the IR theories of Realism, Liberalism and the English School. In regards to Realism, it conceptually explores how international society is considered to be a null-conception through the works of Hobbes and Waltz. To this end, it deals with concepts such as morality, international law and particularly war with a realist perspective. Then Liberalism is explored with its fundamental theoretical differences to Realism, and liberal accounts of international society are analyzed with a Kantian theoretical background and then through contractarian theories of Rawls and Beitz. The second chapter aims to conclude that the liberals have a functional and institutional conception of international society. Finally the concept of international society is truly presented through the English School theory, and its theoretical and conceptual characteristics compared to the former two are discussed. The conclusion of this final chapter will be that the English School conceives of international society in an institutional, cultural and value-based manner.

Keywords: international society, liberalism, realism, English School

ÖZ

GELENEKSEL ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER TEORİLERİNDE ULUSLARARASI TOPLUM KAVRAMI

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Bu çalışma, Uluslararası İlişkilerin Realizm, Liberalizm ve İngiliz Ekolü teorilerinde uluslararası toplum kavramına odaklanmaktadır. Realizm çerçevesinde Hobbes ve Waltz'un eserleri üzerinden uluslararası toplumun nasıl bir boş-kavram olarak telakki edildiğini irdelemektedir. Bu gaye ile ahlak, uluslararası hukuk ve bilhassa savaş gibi kavramları realist bir bakış açısı ile ele almaktadır. Ardından Liberalizm Realizm ile arasındaki temel teorik farklarıyla irdelenmekte ve uluslararası topluma dair liberal izahatlar Kantçı bir arkaplan ile Rawls ve Beitz'in sözleşmeci teorileri üzerinden tahlil edilmektedir. Bu ikinci bölümün amacı liberallerin işlevsel ve kurumsal bir uluslararası toplum kavramına sahip oldukları vargısına ulaşmaktır. Nihayet uluslararası toplum kavramı tam manasıyla İngiliz Ekolü teorisi üzerinden sunulmakta ve buradaki teorik, kavramsal hususiyetleri diğer ikisi ile kıyaslanmaktadır. Bu son bölümün sonucu da İngiliz Ekolü'nün uluslararası toplumu kurumsal, kültürel ve değer tabanlı bir biçimde telakki ettiğidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: uluslararası toplum, liberalizm, realizm, İngiliz Ekolü

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In this study the aim is to provide an account of the concept of international society throughout the theories of Realism, Liberalism and the English School. The attempt is to understand the seminal thinkers of these theories, that is, the theories of Hobbes and Waltz for Realism; Kant, Rawls and Beitz for liberalism; Grotius, Bull, Watson and Wright for the English School; then it is aimed to discuss the position of each of them with respect to the concept of international society. Since they have relatively radical differences in their approaches to such a concept, the attempt to discuss them will necessarily pose conceptual differences as well. The realists discuss the idea of international society in a way that closely likens it to a domestic society; while the idea of liberalism relates itself to international society as a functional and institutional goal towards which endeavors must be made; in contrary to both liberal and realist concepts of international society, the English School attempts to expound a conception of international society that is institutional, cultural and value-based and that has emerged through historical processes. Despite this definitional differences of the concept of the international society, the study will try to find and employ a common ground of discussion for these theories, so that each analysis can be intelligible in comparison to one another. For the comparative approach to the concepts of international society of these three approaches, it is beneficial to provide a baseline

definition for the concept of international society. The simplest definition could be considered as follows: "...societies can be defined, in a Rawlsian sense, as co-operative arrangements for securing the mutual advantage of the members" (Dunne 1998, 10). Here emphasized the mutuality of the members of the collective in forming a society as opposed to remaining mere cluster of units. In a more detailed, albeit still general, definition could be what Wight provides in his own work of comparison: "recognition that the multiplicity of sovereign states forms a moral and cultural whole, which imposes certain moral and psychological and possibly even legal (according to some theories of law) obligations- even if not political ones. As Burke observed: 'The writers on public law have often called this aggregate of nations a commonwealth'" (Wight 1992, 7)

In the first part, Thomas Hobbes as a classical thinker and Kenneth Waltz as a modern thinker will constitute the realist discussion on the concept of the international society. The discussion of the approach of the realist theory to the concept of international society will use a more inferential style of discussion because the realist theory not only excludes a conception of international society but also its fundamental assumptions disregard any such possibility. So I will try to start off with discussions of more fundamental concepts such as morality, international law and war, and then attempt to make inferences regarding the concept of international society from these fundamental terms' relations to one another and to the concept of society. As the classical thinker of political realism Hobbes is chosen on the grounds that he is considered to be one of the profoundest most influential thinkers of not only realism but also all political thought (Wight 1992, 20, Navari 1996); it is noteworthy to mention that, however, there are discussions arguing Hobbes be closer to, in Wight's terms, the rationalist camp rather than the realist (Yurdusev 2006). On the other hand

Waltz is also such a figure in terms of modern theory. So in the first part, the realist theory in its generality will be presented, then its approach to a set of fundamental concepts will be introduced and finally a discussion about the implications of its approach with respect to the concept of international society will be made. At the end of the realist discussion it will be concluded that the realist view can only make the case of an international society as a null-conception.

In the second part takes place a discussion of liberal theory and international society. First, a general look into the liberal theory will be introduced with a conceptual focus on, again, fundamental concepts such as international law, morality and justices. It will be discussed that why these concepts have relevance to international relations, and whether this relevance can constitute a ground for an idea of international society. Then the ideas of Immanuel Kant will be analyzed more extensively since he provides an understanding of a structure that is above the sovereignty of states. The reasoning behind choosing Kant as a focal point in this study relies on Wight's regard for him as a classical example of such thinking (Wight 1992, 42). Finally the theories of contractarian thinkers regarding an international social structure will be discussed with John Rawls and Charles Beitz as central thinkers. The contractual approach of Rawls and Beitz were instrumental in them being the focus of liberal theory since such an approach is comparable to that of Hobbes. Their approach to building an atmosphere of international relations where justice and law possess a meaning will be elaborated. It will be concluded that the liberal theory has a functional and institutional conception of international society.

In the third part, a discussion of the English School theory will be conducted. The way and the ground that they laid down a theory of international society that exist in the contemporary international affairs will be explored. Questions such that regards

the theoretical framework of the historical formation of the international society will lead the way. The discussion will include the relation of the concept of international society to concepts like law, morality and common interest. The discussion will start with the exploration of views of Grotius whose thoughts are considered to be influential for the thinkers of the English School, as the leading thinker of what Wight calls a rationalist tradition (Wight 1992, 42, Linklater and Suganami 2006, 82). Then the concept of order will prove significant in regarding Bull's exposition of an anarchical society, the distinction he lays down between an international system and an international society will be explained in conceptual and historical ways. The way Bull expounds on the concept of international institutions as playing central roles in the existence of international society will be discussed. It will be demonstrated that how the concepts of balance of power, diplomacy, international law, war and great powers operate as international institutions. Finally, I will try to provide a brief comparative analysis between the English School, Realism and Liberalism. The common and different aspects of the assumptions of the English School compared the liberal and realist theories, will be shown. The conclusion will be that the English School conceives of an international society which developed institutions around a certain diplomatic culture with certain values at its base.

CHAPTER 2

REALISM: INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS A NULL-SOCIETY

The concept of society in international relations is a vague one in the debates of international relations theory. Its existence, possible forms, history and conception, all relates to a different branch of controversy. Because of its conceptual vagueness it is difficult to delineate it in a precise fashion in order to conduct an examination of it in any contours of IR theory. It is also to be heeded that some theories never deal with the concept at hand directly, due to their own ontological and epistemological outlooks. For example, if a theory is assuming that the earth is flat then it cannot discuss the effects of Earth's rotation on atmospheric events. Because simply a theory that assumes Earth being flat discards the idea that Earth is self-rotating whose admittance is a prerequisite for the subject matter. In turn, if we are intent on discussing a subject matter throughout different theoretical outlooks we must delve deeper into them until we find a common ground on which we can discuss the issue at hand. Something similar is also in question with respect to the concept of international society and IR theories. Some theories directly make the case of an international society, like the English School, and some others are capable of positively engaging in this discussion in terms of their own understanding, like Liberalism. However the engagement of the realist theory in this discussion can only be considered negative. Realism is grounded

upon such assumptions that the concept of international society is not a subject matter per se for discussion. It is an alien concept, it does not provide a discussion about the sources, forms and processes of an international society, in realism exists rather a null-conception of international society. As a result, the discussion of Realism cannot be maintained by focusing solely on the concept of international society. In order to make the argumentations and comparisons among these theoretical outlooks of Realism, Liberalism and the English School relatable, I find it crucial to consider other concepts relevant to that of society, such as morality, ethics, law and, common and self-interest. After examining the realist approach to these concepts The chapter try to infer and interpret its approach to the concept of international society. Ultimately, it will be concluded that the realist conception of international society is a null-conception.

E.H. Carr speaks of realism not as a positive theory (Donnelly 2004, 105). This means that the purpose of the realist IR theory is not to present a way of producing and applying foreign policy for states. It does not *posit* any policies or strategies. The mission realism takes on is closer to a negative theory (Donnelly 2004, 121), that is, it analyzes an action or an idea and considers whether it is compatible or correct in the framework of its realization. It *negates* a given understanding or a practice or an idea. In other words, it tries to show what is *not* good or *not* right to do or think in international relations. I will go along with this view of Realism as a negative theory and examine the realist views on concepts like society, morality, international law etc. with respect to the way that realism believes these to be groundless in international relations. So the question about realism that I will embark on answering is something like this: Why does realism consider these concepts irrelevant to international relations?

Given there is a large number of varying realist perspectives which would be impossible to discuss in a study of this scale, the study will focus on the views and conceptions of two realist thinkers, Thomas Hobbes and Kenneth Waltz.

2.1. Thomas Hobbes as a Classical Thinker

Realist tradition is skeptical of the relevance of morality to international relations (Forde 2004, 62). The anarchical structure of international relations and the common conception of unreliability of human temperament lead realists to championing a view of self-help (Forde 2004, 63). For this reason, what becomes determinant in shaping decisions and actions are self-interest and necessity rather than moral concerns. For instance Machiavelli considers war unavoidable but only to be deferred, which however would benefit the enemy (Forde 2004, 66), Hobbes and Rousseau speaks of a state of war as an ongoing state of opposition and potential conflict (Forde 2004, 63). For Machiavelli the inevitability of war not only makes it something that one should always be prepared for, but also reduces the act of war in a kind of defensive context. He says that the Romans were “compelled” to attack and conquer the Greeks in order to obstruct the development and appearance of a future threat (Forde 2004, 65). That is to say war is like a natural phenomenon such as rain or earthquakes, which cannot be prevented and cautious approach is crucial for survival. So Hobbes, as a general aspect of the realist tradition, too, seems to maintain a distrustful, calculative and self-interested approach to international politics. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss Hobbes’ political theory in terms of the concept of international society. It is important to note beforehand that Hobbes’ himself does not relate to the concept; his views about human nature, the state of nature and social

formation seem to be useful conceptual tools in analyzing the way that realism regards international society as a null-conception.

In the history of political thought the idea of a state of nature preceding the formation of society is common among the early modern thinkers of contractual theory of society. Hobbes is one of the prominent figures. To him, a covenant among individuals gives rise to the society as the sovereign. Society and the sovereign are indistinct for Hobbes. In discussing Hobbes' contractual theory it is essential to pay heed to the technical and terminological details of the contract, or the covenant in Hobbes' terms, because in Hobbes technical meticulousness makes the case.

Hobbes believes that in the state of nature human beings are equal to one another in terms of vulnerability (Hobbes 1985, 183). Hobbes explains this by saying that some people have physical strength and some others have intellectual strength, and at the end of the day every person is encumbered with sleep, hunger and sickness, which makes each person as vulnerable as everybody else. In this individualistic conditions, everybody is in a perpetually ongoing state of opposition, or as Hobbes calls it, everyone is in a state of war (Hobbes 1985, 185). Notably, Hobbes clarifies that a state of war is not a constant act of battling, it is a state of affairs without security and with an ever-present sense of danger. The individual never even feels a respite from the possibilities that he/she could be attacked, or his/her food and water supply could be seized by another individual. In the state of war everyone has a right to everything because everyone is for himself or herself and it is a right to do anything to ensure one's survival, which evidently leads to the constant state of unrest and hence the state of war (Hobbes, 188-9). Only by a covenant, which embodies the renunciation of rights and powers entertained by each person in the state of nature and afterwards the emergence of a sovereign, a society comes about. Individuals come together

deciding that they will renounce their rights reciprocally and that they will choose a person or a group of persons to watch over the society, this agent is the sovereign.

In Hobbes's view, the international sphere corresponds to the state of nature (Forde 2004, 75). There is no sovereign power above states and therefore each is in pursuit of its own subsistence. Like an individual in the state of nature, each state has every right to obtain anything and do anything. However there are two striking differences between human beings in the state of nature and states in the state of nature. The first is that while individuals in state of nature are bestowed with equality by nature, states are not equal (Donnelly 2004, 96). Position and capacity of each state is relative to each other. In absolute terms a state may possess an incredibly efficient and big economy and a large army equipped with the highest technology and technical prowess, but its actual capacity is discernible only in comparison to the other states; or an enemy of a state may not be the so strong in itself but it can be stronger than the state that it is in conflict against. Secondly, unlike for individuals, there exists a lack of imperative for states to form a society. In the state of nature, the natural processes like hunger, sleep and sickness can render a person powerless to defend himself and unable to seek his own survival alone. For this reason human beings can feel obliged to come together and form a society by contract. This is the imperative that is missing in the case of states which are not ailed by diseases, hunger or the need of sleep (Waltz 2001, 162). In other words, states do not feel danger so much as humans would feel in the state of nature (Forde 2004, 76); anarchy does not influence the well-being of states in the same way it does in the case of individuals (Heller 1980, 22) This constitutes one of the reasons why the states are considered to be in the state of nature, and of war, permanently. There is nothing among the states that compels them to determine a sovereign and form a society. Attention is to be paid to the fact that the discarded

possibility of society here is based on the idea of a society akin to what human beings individually created by contract in order to end their state of nature. Herein we assume that an international society is similar to a domestic society. So at best, according to Hobbes's theory of contract, states are incapable of constructing a society like the one they themselves constitute. As Forde put it "The societies thus formed, however, remain in the state of nature themselves, that is, the state of war" (Forde 2004, 75).

It can be considered possible for states to transcend the necessity of self-help by not covenants but treaties they make or rules and regulations they voluntarily impose on themselves which will be the case when we discuss Kantian view of world federation. This absence of enforcement is a prevalent premise in realist international relations theory. Rousseau, too, regards it significant, maybe, above all.

With respect to state of war and society of nations, Forde asserts something significant, "if there is a 'society of nations' it is not strong enough to overcome the state of war" (Forde 2004, 63). The significance of this is that it can help us outline the concept of society in realist view from a different and relatively more specified perspective. I have said that the realists do not much directly discuss about international society because of their assumptions and views on rather fundamental issues like human nature or international system. However, war is a topic for abundant and wide discussions in realism. So, by incorporating the discussion of war into our discussion of society and on the basis of Forde's assertion above regarding the relationship between war and society, we can examine why realists do not have a conception of society in their theory. In other words, by looking into the existence of war, we can understand the reasons why realists regards international society absent; besides, such an investigation into the concept and practice of war is significant because the relationship among nations and their way of warring each other is also a

topic of discussion in the chapter on the English School. So the next part which is on Kenneth Waltz's views in terms of international relations will begin with an investigation of war and Waltz's book of *Man, the State and War*, will present the main conceptual framework of the investigation since it is very helpful due to its systematic differentiation of reasons for why war occurs in three levels of analysis: human nature, the structure of state and the structure of international system.

2.2. Kenneth Waltz and International Structure

In addition to classical realist writers, modern ones are also skeptical of any serious enduring formation among states based on something other than self-interest. Gilpin asserts that power and security is primary in state relations (Gilpin 1984, 290). Reasons for the primacy of power and security are not in much variance but there exists a difference of emphasis. All realist writers of international relations consider the impacts of human nature, state structure and the international anarchy upon the actions of states and the self-help system, however, some of them focus on the inevitability of human nature and vice while others stress the inescapability of anarchy prevalent in international politics. For example, Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr pays attention to human nature. Morgenthau remarks on "the tragic presence of evil in all political action" (H. Morgenthau 1947, 173) and says that "reason, far from following its own inherent impulses, is driven toward its goals by the irrational forces the ends of which it serves" (H. Morgenthau 1947, 134). E.H. Carr notes one the inconclusiveness of imagining "a hypothetical world in which men no longer organize themselves in groups for purposes of conflict" (Carr 1946, 231). Although they emphasize the human nature, it is impossible to ignore the role of anarchy in the international politics. This relationship is very well put by Herbert Butterfield, "the

difference between civilization and barbarism is ... essentially the same human nature when it works under different conditions” (Butterfield 1950, 31). Human nature does not disappear under political order in domestic politics, but it is “tamed by a hierarchical political structure of authority and rule” (Donnelly 2004, 87). However anarchy, which means the absence of political authority rather than a complete chaos or lack of order, allows the human nature to be much more easily acted on (Donnelly 2004, 87). So the general realist logic goes as such, first, human beings are by nature greedy and selfish, second, there is no higher power in international politics to suppress human vice which takes the form of a state, third, and therefore states never voluntarily act on something other than self-interest. It is noteworthy to remind that there are scholars who deliberately prioritize the condition of anarchy in explaining international relations.

In his introduction, Waltz pinpoints the relevant question of his book as understanding the underlying causes of occurrences of war. Should we focus on the nature of human beings or the individual states that comprised individuals or the system of states comprising independent states (Waltz, *Man, the State and War* 2001, 6)? He concedes that all the three categories are simultaneously significant in making war possible, however, he emphasizes some are more fundamental than others. In elucidating these three categories Waltz uses three images: that of human nature, that of state and that of international system.

The first image dealing with the influence of human nature in the occurrence of war is mostly similar in content to what I have talked about above with respect to human nature when I mentioned Morgenthau and Hobbes. The difference of emphasis regarding the images can be exemplified by a Morgenthau quote made by Waltz: “In a world where power counts no nation pursuing a rational policy has a choice between

renouncing and wanting power; and, *if it could*, the lust for power for individual's sake would still confront us with its less spectacular yet no less pressing moral defects" (Morgenthau qtd in (Waltz 2001, 35)). Here Morgenthau remarks that even if we have a means to exert power over nations which would enable them to seek other things than sole self-help and power, even if there exists an environment for states to freely pursue moral integrity, the vicious nature of human beings would present us similar immoral problems. Circumstances are only contingent while human beings' hunger for power is a necessity. So the idea that vice is embedded in human nature is fundamental for Morgenthau in causing wars.

Another point Waltz makes in the first image regards the arguments of psychologists and social psychologists about the occurrence and prevention of war. Their arguments focus on subjects related to cultural differences and pedagogy. For instance Waltz quotes James Miller who says that, basically, being ignorant of the other's culture, as in their practices, aspirations, desires etc. leads to aggression (Waltz 2001, 66). So Miller's argument is simply an argument of epistemology and emotion, we fear what we do not know, and this fear engenders distrust which results in conflictual situations. Waltz's answer is embodied in this question: "Does understanding bring peace?" and he gives examples from historical figures like Friedrich von Schlegel, who, as Waltz claims, became more nationalist after learning about other people's culture in his trips (Waltz 2001, 49). We can ask a relevant question directly connected to our subject-matter of society, is cultural understanding fundamental to a peaceful society? In countries like Turkey or the USA, for instance, in which people from different cultural heritages form a single society, is the underlying factor in sustaining the order and peace, that the people from different cultures understand each other? I think not. Miller's idea assumes something more

than a simple connection between knowing someone and having therefore empathy. Seeing the way the other lives, knowing their history, culture and even casual activities does not necessarily engender sympathy. Upon obtaining such a knowledge one may simply dislike another. We can consider that Miller's point here is more about acknowledging the humanity of one's enemy so that sympathy can emerge, however this still is not a strong argument. War does not necessarily mean that the conflictual parties have been regarding each other inhuman. Therefore there is not a correlation between knowledge and sympathy to an extent enough to influence the occurrence of war. On the other hand, knowledge is not exclusively about sympathy, one people can very well dislike another because they know them. And lastly, even existing societies do not rely on knowing and loving each other's culture so much as they rely on the power of law and authority and interest. So a group of people who is ignorant of or even disapproving of the culture of another is still able to coexist under the power of law and state. Consequently Waltz thinks that a society is possible to exist because there is a higher power that protects the order by law and enforcement and that such an argument of epistemology and emotion is irrelevant.

Regarding the pedagogical arguments in explaining war the idea is that if the administrators in governments and international organizations are provided with and raised by a proper education they would know the just and moral course of action in reaching their goals and therefore would not resort to war and aggression. However, first of all the theoretical prowess of this idea comes to naught in practice. Waltz claims that the application of this idea requires an organization which would hold sway similar to a supranational government, over states (68). Because only by this, a common education can be provided to the administrators, students and government officials working in different countries. Also, the argumentation contains logical

fallacy in the form of *petitio principii*. The solution suggested for the problem assumes the very problem or disregards it. The problem is that we have war among states; the recommended solution is to provide a common befriending education to the peoples, as future administrators, of these states. The recommendation does not account for how it is possible to instill such an education policy all around the world. As if there is an agency having such an authority to enforce states to apply this policy. In the end, the question is begged. Other than such practical objections and logical fallacies, Waltz has a theoretical objection. He claims that since war is a social phenomenon, it cannot be attributed to individual traits. He charges those who make such reductions with psychologism (Waltz 2001, 28). Reductionism is the way of explaining phenomena by attributing the traits of their components; a simple example would be such a reasoning: society is superstitious because the comprising individuals are superstitious. Waltz's arguments of anti-psychologism here works on two levels: the individual as the component of the state and the states as the components of the international system (Mouritzen 2005, 78). So for Waltz "correction" or change in the actions of individuals and the policies of states does not necessarily affect the relations among states, including, war. The second and third images of Waltz's argument will elucidate this important point.

The second image deals with the argument that war stems from the vices inherent in the structure of states and it suggests that a change in the structure of states would bear fruit in establishing peace among them. The most famous example is the ideas of the former president of the USA Woodrow Wilson. He had a simple reasoning that if the principle of national self-determination were to prevail in every state, peace would cease to be a mere dream. Because national determination means democracy and democracy is, above all, a peaceful regime (Waltz, Man, the State and War 2001,

118). Waltzian response to this sort of an argument would be that the internal features of a states such as their ideologies, political or economic regimes etc. should be disregarded within form a perspective of international politics (Waltz 1979, 99). Waltz seems disinterested in the frameworks and behaviors of states; although an opposing argument is made, maintaining that Waltz's theory of anarchy entails a theory of state or a presupposition of state behavior (Polansky 2016).

Another view in the second image, Waltz lays down, is the contribution of war to the "internal integrity" of the state. Here, he refers to Jean Bodin, quoting "'the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against...civil war is to keep the subjects in amity one with another, and to this end, to find an enemy against whom they can make common cause" (Waltz 2001, 81). So, it is necessary to direct hostility towards a common enemy for sustaining the social integrity. War is a condition, a requirement for a state to exist and function properly. Hence the inevitability of war in international politics. Notably this idea contains elements from opinions about human nature. Apparently societies are such structures that cannot sustain themselves without an outside reference which takes up the role of the enemy. Within the each member of a society there seems to be an irrepressible predisposition to violence. Unless this violence is directed by political expediency the society could collapse. And such an expediency requires the outside enemy and the war as a uniting factor. As I have said above explanations about war are seldom grounded on a singular element and in Bodin's views we witness the mix of human nature and state structure. Necessity of war for the preservation of state integrity also means that the world peace is impossible a dream to come true. It implies such an impossibility because there is no enemy outside the world that would give birth to amity among the states of the world and consequently rid us of warring against each other. However the claim of impossibility

can be revoked, in my opinion, considering that the environmental problems constitute a common enemy for the whole world, although, as it seems for the moment, they are yet to attain such a level of threat in the eyes of international political arena.

Before discussing Waltz's third image, we will appeal to another view regarding the relationship between war and states. The idea that the state is inseparable from war is also conspicuous in Carl Schmitt's views. In *The Concept of the Political*, Schmitt attempts to give an account of what is categorically political and the concept of state has its place in it. The very first sentence of the book goes as follows: "the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political" (Schmitt 2007, 19) This means that the state is inherently a political concept entailing the contents of this category. So what is the political? Schmitt argues that all the fundamental areas of thought have a distinction at their foundation, such as aesthetics that have the ugly and the beautiful or the moral that have the good and the bad. In the same vein, the foundational political distinction is friend and enemy (Schmitt 2007, 26). Distinguishing one as an enemy makes this act political. Schmitt claims that the state is the agency that makes this distinction on its own and other political decisions and actions follow this primary decision of distinction. It is crucial to note that the Schmittian concept of enemy has its own content. The enemy is not a hostile person, it is not a private opponent. "The enemy is solely the public enemy" (Schmitt 2007, 28). This is important because the enemy is a threat to the public life along with the actual physical lives of people. Also the Schmittian concept of enemy entails the "ever-present possibility of combat" (Schmitt 2007, 30). Existence of the enemy never allows us a moment of relief. Notably this is very reminiscent of the Hobbesian state of war. The enemy is the constant threat to the way of life. The remedy to this problem is war, "war is the existential negation of the enemy" (Schmitt 2007, 33). One must

destroy the enemy in order to get rid of the existential threat. To clarify, the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political; the political begins with the decision on friend-enemy distinction and is about the relevant steps after this decision; the state is an agency that independently makes the decision about who the enemy is; and the enemy is an existential threat that needs to be eliminated through war. This depicts the concept of state as a war machine. It is as if the state exists to war. War is so essential for the concept of state that Schmitt asserts the necessity of the existence of at least two states (Schmitt 2007, 53). If there was one state in the world there would not be any other state as the enemy, which would spell the end of the political since the political can only exist when there is a friend-enemy distinction. Without the political the state cannot exist because the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political. Consequently what is called the one state in the world is not a state, but a different sort of organized community.

John Stuart Mill tries to apply the harmony of interest to the relations among states. He says that a country should look for its benefit in the benefit of other countries, and that only therein such benefit exists (Waltz, Man, the State and War 2001, 99). Here one is reminded of the saying “War never pays.” The liberal thinking regarding the possibility of cooperation will be discussed further alongside that the idea of international judiciary. As some liberals put forward the idea of an international court, but the peculiar point is that there is no international higher authority to enforce the judgements of the courts. Its legitimacy and, if there is something as such, enforcement would be the world public opinion. It would act as a deterrent against war (Waltz 2001, 101-2).

In the third image Waltz attempts to explain why the international anarchy is the fundamental reason of war. He asserts that war is inevitable and self-help is

paramount where there is no authority of enforcement, and that since any other state can freely resort to violence, being ready and powerful enough to encounter it is the only escape from the perils of destruction (Waltz 2001, 160).

Most of Waltz's arguments in the third image rest on Rousseau's political philosophy. Rousseau differs from Hobbes who thinks that human beings are egotistic and envious in state of nature, which is one of the basic premises that lead to the state of war (Forde 2004, 78). For Rousseau these traits are acquired by humans when they enter into a society, or at least come in contact with each other (Waltz, *Man, the State and War* 2001, 183-4). In other words, emotions and conceptions that drive individuals to come into conflict, are not traits they are born with, these are learnt from others, they are of nurture rather than nature. This is why Rousseau is against the idea that interdependence that is grounded on commercial interests between states can prevent conflict. He believes they are not only ineffective but, on the contrary, detrimental to interstate relations. The European society of states extant in Rousseau's time was highly developed and interconnected, and for him, this only made their competition fiercer and their relations, more precarious (Forde 2004, 79). The European society of states had formed an interconnected system and any change occurring in any state in the system or part of it had impact on the entirety of the system. So he considered that there prevailed a state of war in the Europe. The only solution according to Rousseau was a European League which holds sway over states to enforce rules and treaties. He believed that, apart from a supranational power's enforcement, state will not by themselves renounce their sovereignty and act in contrast to their interests. For Rousseau, this would still be the case if all the states were structured as he laid down in his theory of social contract, a society which embodies the general will of its people. He develops a theory of a just contractual society in his *Social Contract*. This society

embodies what is generally called a direct democracy as opposed to a representative democracy. Herein all the public decisions are to be made by the public itself. They debate the issues and put it to a vote and the decision that gains the most votes are taken (Rousseau 1988, 151). Such a decisions would constitute just decisions because everybody voiced their opinions and contributed to the decision making process. This decision is called the general will. Rousseau remarks that the justice constituted by the general will is irrelevant to those outside the public and that the general will may not have concerns for the extraneous others (Forde 2004, 78). Therefore the inner qualities of a state is ineffective in transcending the international anarchy and directing states to act in a peaceful way. In the end, Rousseau too considers a power above states essential for establishing an order similar to that of a society among them.

So Rousseau's theory of society is constituted by direct democracy and the prevalence of the opinions of the majority which is called the general will of the society (Rousseau 1988, 101). Opinions are discussed in a direct manner, hence direct democracy, and not through representatives, because Rousseau is distrustful of them (Rousseau 1988, 142-143). In this directly democratic society the actions and policies that have the support of the majority of the people are pursued, and the minority concedes that they were wrong (Rousseau 1988, 151). Every decision taken by such means is considered to be the will of the general public, hence the general will. For Rousseau where the general will is in power, there exists a just society. However even in the case of a state which is the embodied form of the general will of its society and hence a just society, the general does not necessarily have any regards for the well-being of the outsiders, i.e. foreigners, other states etc.. This matters immensely for Waltz.

Waltz claims that the level of integrity in Rousseau's theory is crucial, and its purpose is to warrant justice within the society. So Waltz upholds Rousseau's view and claims that democratic state does not necessarily bring peace to interstate relations (Waltz 2001, 177). On the contrary the integrity and the justice of a society within itself can exacerbate its external relations. The general will of the society represents the aspirations, desires and the needs of the society itself. In the path of reaching these, the general will can very well ignore the needs and aspirations of a foreigner element who is not included in the general will. Indeed these concerns are more relevant to the problems within the state structure in giving way to wars. But I deemed it necessary to mention them here because Waltz does so in his third image in order to present a juxtaposition between the two images so that it becomes conspicuous that the most fundamental cause of war is beyond the borders of the states.

First of all we should take a look at Rousseau's idea of democracy and international relations. As mentioned previously, Rousseau maintains that a just society is where the governments is the general will of its people (Rousseau 1988, 101). Rousseau's society is the so-called direct democracy where each and every person voices his/ her own opinion in the governance of the society without any representative agency in which Rousseau is completely distrustful (Rousseau 1988, 142-143). In this directly democratic society the actions and policies that have the support of the majority of the people are pursued, and the minority concedes that they were wrong (Rousseau 1988, 151). Every decision taken by such means is considered to be the will of the general public, hence the general will. For Rousseau where the general will is in power, there exists a just society. However even in the case of a state which is the embodied form of the general will of its society and hence a just society,

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With respect to the international anarchy, Waltz continues leaning on Rousseau. If international peace is tried to be established through the concept of general will, it is necessary to look for ways leading to the formation of a general will of the world. Rousseau suggests that the private businesses of individuals should not take part in the state because the state is where public issues are dealt with by the very public itself. Similarly, Waltz argues that the particularity of each state should not be the subject matter of the general will of the international system (Waltz, *Man, the State and War* 2001, 182). By particularity of independent states, Waltz tries to mean what Rousseau meant by the private business of individuals. So the internal affairs of each state is its own business, therefore it remains irrelevant to the general will of the world. This sublation leads to the existence of a higher political entity in whose eyes each state is an equal component, just as individuals are in the eyes of the state. In other words, the general will of the world can only be formed through eliminating the international anarchy. An institution of higher political capacity over the states, that is, a supra-national power is called for. This is why Waltz rejects ideas about forming a system

of intergovernmental federation on the basis of states' volition (Waltz 2001, 185). Peace is the result of a forced, not voluntary, renunciation. Integrity is secured by power. Accordingly Waltz asserts "In anarchy there is no automatic harmony" (Waltz 2001, 160). Harmony among human persons and groups cannot be achieved by expecting that they voluntarily submit to the collective interest rather than self-interest. As a result of such a voluntarily formed international community, that is, the 18th century European states system, Rousseau says " [The European states] must inevitably fall into quarrels and dissensions at the first changes that come about...[because the system is] formed and maintained by nothing better than chance" and the changes leading to quarrels would be the "promptings of self-interests" for there is no force to deter the pursuance of self-interest (Waltz 2001, 183-4). In so far as their system is established by volition, it can be broken by volition as well. This is what anarchy means, an arena of clash of will without restriction. However it is important to keep in mind the discussion Suganami offers as to the causes of war, where he distinguishes different understandings of anarchy and assesses its relationship between war and the conception of the state as a warring tool (Suganami 1996, 62-63).

Taking into account the ideas about the general will, for Waltz, the existence of an international society depends on an international power. Such a power would be able sustain the order, law and even morality by force. But neither such a power nor, consequently, the international society (in the manner we consider here similar to a domestic one) exists. Waltz's suggestion as to the solution of the problem of anarchy is either a power that has rule over each particular state or removing the particularity of each state by a normalization of all the states into a definition of a perfect state, assuming that such a thing is conceivable. However I believe these two solutions are

overlapping or at least, complementary. What is meant by particularity of states is, that each state has its own needs, advantages, aspirations and wills different or even contradictory to one another, something considerably similar to Rousseau's conception of private business of citizens in the eyes of the general will. These qualities particular to each state constitutes the particularity of each one of them. Waltz suggests that it is necessary to render their particularities obsolete by transforming each of them into the same sort of state. As a result the concerns, interests, aspirations and, in general, the way of living of all the states would be the same. To put it differently, imposition of uniformity upon states is in question. Hence peace among them can be instilled. However it seems not possible to make each state equal to and same as one another without a continuous political authority over them. What I mean should not be confused with the necessity of a power which is able to directly coerce states to become something else. Because I believe just dissolving the particularities of states is ontologically impossible without a higher category of political entity. This is why I consider Waltz's two solutions to be overlapping or at least complementary. You cannot get uniformity among states without a higher power to enforce it.

Waltz is unclear about what is meant by removing the particularities of states. Although not clarified, it seems unlikely that Waltz meant the uniformity of government regimes or structure of governments. Because first, it would be too narrow an understanding of particularity compared to what Waltz himself has put forward above in regard to Rousseau's general will. Also such an understanding would not be different from the claims of those who champion the changes and democratization in the internal governmental systems of states in order to establish peace such as the propositions of Woodrow Wilson, saying that institution of democracy would result in peace among nations. The uniformity that Waltz speaks of may refer to the ontological

status of states. We can formulate this in various ways, one of which is to consider the phrase ‘to be subjected to.’ A state may be subjected to a natural disaster, such as an earthquake, or an attack by another state. In the end what a state is subjected to is only relevant for itself. This is similar in logic to the idea of relativity of gain in international politics. All subjections are particular to the one entity that is being subjected to something. Subjection is personal, if we are allowed to personify states for the sake of expression. Insofar as subjection is personal, particularity is unbreachable. Because the dissolution of particularities of things require a common ground as in a common problem, common interest etc. and insofar as subjection is personal or state-specific the less common ground can be found among them. Particularity should be overcome to the extent that there is a common subjection between parties. As parties are subjected to the same thing, they obtain a common ground. The more common ground states have, the more similar they will become to each other. If two things have no common subjection, it is impossible to establish any kind of common ground between them. Accordingly the common ground, the connection between the parties ceases to exist as soon as their common subjection is perceived to be extinguished. So the connection lasts as much as the subjection; and the stronger and more widespread the subjection the deeper the connection becomes.

This is why countries have been able to make commercial and economic deals, because they are subjected to same category of needs. Also the European Union, as states who have become subjected to the same geopolitics, same threats, as in the Eastern bloc, to same economic circumstances, to similar devastations of the World Wars and before coming about, beginning as a coal union and then economy etc.. In short, connection with the other requires common subjection. And only through such a connection, particularities of parties, in this case that of states can be overcome.

Accordingly the lesser the subjections in common are, the greater the particularities become. As pointed out above, I do not believe that Waltz uses the term particularities to signify the particular economic and political structures, regimes or systems that each particular state operate with. These particularities imply the way states perceive each other as beings, that is to say, their ontological perception of each other. Indeed it is not meant that states perceive each other as categorically different beings. A categorical difference would be like the difference, intuitively speaking, between a cat and a knife, a human and a planet. In other words a categorical difference means difference in abstraction. However little similar two persons be, they are the same in abstract terms. This is valid for states as well. Categorically, or in abstract terms they are the same political entity. Sovereignty and independence makes them as such. But the absence of common subjection renders them separate entities. Each is strikingly 'the other' for each other. What one of them suffers from or what it is subjected to is irrelevant to the other to the extent that the other is alien to the subjection in question. It seems plausible to say that what Waltz means can be interpreted as this striking otherness when he speaks of particularities.

In addition, the idea of a common enemy can constitute an example for the idea of common subjection.

In crude terms, therefore, what a states-system lacks to form an international integrity could be a common enemy which would satisfy the necessity of a common subjection, given that it should be continuous and so strong that it elicits the need to unite against it. The most possible common subjection for states would be the global warming or the environmental crisis in general, the extreme –and possibly absurd- and most easily understandable example would be an alien invasion. Global warming is a phenomenon that impacts the whole planet irrespective of the borders, cultures,

languages, agreements etc. and its solution, if possible, is only possible through a worldwide collaboration. Indeed the collaboration is strong and long-lasting insofar as the environmental crisis is perceived to be a worldwide subjection. Other than this, there seems nothing to pose a worldwide threat and unite the world under its sway in the horizon so that we can eliminate the anarchy in the way Waltz suggests.

All this discussion about common subjection and particularity is about Waltz's second solution to international anarchy, namely, the solution of removing particularities among states. I claimed that it seems unfeasible without incorporating the first solution which is the existence of a supranational power over states. Because only a supranational power is able reduce all the states to 'subjects' by subjecting them to its authority and only under such a subjection, or through such a state of being subjected to the same thing, states can be able to overcome their particularities. Consequently I argue for the conflation of Waltz's two solutions for the international anarchy in order for his general point to be more consistent.

At the end of his analysis Waltz concludes that the only solution to anarchy is government. Additionally he emphasizes that international anarchy is not the sole reason for why wars are waged, it is strictly the most fundamental reason (Waltz, *Man, the State and War* 2001, 232). The reasons for any specific war are occasional, immediate and can be explained correctly by the first and second images. The significance of the third image, Waltz remarks, is that the influence and function of the first and second images depend on the third image, namely, the international anarchy (Waltz 2001, 238).

In regard to our discussion, Waltz would believe that the anarchy is opposite of a societal order. For a society to exist it is essential there is a power over the subjects. Order can only be instilled and sustained by power. War and society are antithetical,

where a society exists, therein war does not. This runs parallel with what I quoted from Forde above regarding the power of a society of states lying in its capacity to prevent war. The relationship between the concepts of war and the international relations will again be important when the views of the English School are discussed in the third chapter of this study.

With regards to Waltz's idea that peace is the result of forced renunciation, seems to be contradictory to Hobbes' description of how a society is formed. We have mentioned that Hobbes called the state of nature, a state of war which would continue to exist unless a society come about through a covenant among individuals. Hobbes poses a question in order to point out and explain a potential weak point of his formulation. The question is that if the sovereign can breach any of the laws it laid down as the sovereign; in other words, is the sovereign bound by its own laws as its subjects are (Hobbes, 313)? Hobbes' answer is in the negative, that is to say, the sovereign cannot be considered transgressing its own laws, because the sovereign is not a part of the covenant that conditions the parties to complete obedience to the will of the sovereign –except in cases of self-harm and self-protection which are not out subject-matter at the moment. In order to explain his response to this question Hobbes revisits the making of the covenant and its circumstances. I will also do thus. Under the conditions of the state of war where every one is against every one without any restrictions to the individual freedom whereby a moment of individual respite can be sustained, there is nothing but destruction. So, at a certain moment in the state of nature, the individuals decide to give up on their rights to everything and their unbridled freedom in the conditions that their safety is provided by a sovereign agent. Here is the key part of Hobbes' formulation which explains his response that the sovereign cannot be held accountable for breaching its own laws. According to Hobbes, when

individuals made a covenant renouncing their rights and freedom in exchange of a peaceful society where the individual safety of them is protected by the sovereign, the person or the group of persons taking up the sovereignty does not partake in this covenant (Hobbes, 230). In other words the covenant is something only between the individuals who would later be called the subjects of the covenant; the sovereign is not a party to it. Although this may seem problematic at first Hobbes is meticulous in his formulation. He asserts that there is no sovereign until the covenant is made, so the sovereign cannot be a party because it does not exist yet. The sovereign only exists when the individuals completed the covenant agreeing to renounce their rights and freedoms. After this collective renunciation the sovereign comes about.

It still remains necessary to elucidate the way the sovereign emerges. When individuals of the state of nature, give up on their rights to everything and the freedom to do anything, the person or the group of persons who shall assume the role of the sovereign do not renounce their rights and freedoms (Hobbes, 227). So, when the covenant of renunciation is completed, the parties to it become subjects, and the one or ones who did not give up their rights and freedoms emerges as the only power holder similar to the individuals of the state of nature. The covenant does not only document the renunciation but also the pledge made to the sovereign. It is vitally important to note that this covenant does not bind the sovereign since it is not a party to it. Consequently an act of the sovereign that is contrary to the existent law cannot be considered as a transgression because the sovereign is not a subject of the covenant that dictates obedience to the sovereign and its laws.

Now, it is necessary to make the connection to the contradiction between Hobbes and Waltz who claimed above that peace was the result of forced renunciation, not voluntary. Hobbes' formulation of the formation of society has been given; and it

is seen that the parties of the covenant renounce their rights and freedoms voluntarily in order to obtain peace. Each and every one of them give up their unbridled powers as individuals by a decision made by their free-wills. There is no one forcing them to do as such and establish peace. It can be reminded of that the Hobbesian natural laws require the establishment of peace, but they are not laws as such in the capacity to enforce its requirements. Their capacity is more like that of a principle or, in more cynical terms, of a suggestion. At this junction the contradiction between Waltz and Hobbes becomes conspicuous. According to Hobbes, peace is the result of a voluntary renunciation, the exact opposite of Waltz's claim above.

One possible and tenable objection to this argument could be that the individuals are not really renouncing their rights and freedoms out of volition, but they are in fact forced to make such decision by the state of nature which is a state of war. In this state of war, where there is no one moment of peace, the individuals fears for their individual security and give up their rights and freedoms in exchange for a safe haven from the state of war. So their renunciation is in fact out fear and force, not of volition.

Hobbes takes this predicament into account in his formulation as well. His explanation attempts to show that fear does not annul free-will. The exercise of free-will is independent of the fact that whether it is exercised out of fear or out of personal predilection. Hobbes explains in this fashion (Hobbes, 262): think of a man on a boat in the middle of a sea with his riches in chests. For a certain random reason the boat starts to sink, and it appears that if the weight of the ship can be reduced the sinking can be slowed down or even prevented. So the man throws some of his chests out into sea. Here Hobbes claims that the man here is free in his action of throwing out his chests. It is true that he threw out the chests out of fear for his life, but Hobbes argues

that nobody actually and physically forced him into such an action and that he was completely free to choose to keep the chests and sink and drown to death. Albeit possibly unwise a decision this would be, it was within the volition of the man on the boat. He could just choose death. But he did not; he chose to get rid of the chests in order to survive. Consequently making decision out of fear for one's life does not count as a moment of forced decision-making. What we can infer from this argument is that individuals are free and voluntary when they decide to give up their rights and freedoms in order to make a covenant and establish a peaceful social order, even though the initial motivation for their renunciation was the fearful conditions of the state of war.

A second objection can be raised in regards to a situation under certain circumstances. Hobbes describes it as such (Hobbes, 231): there is a region full of individuals who are living in the state of nature. They decide to enter into a covenant with each other in order to attain peace. However there is a minority of people who decides not to give up their rights and freedoms, which is in their individual prerogative to decide to renounce or not. Nobody forces them into making any decisions. So this the individuals who comprise a minority decide not to partake in the covenant by renouncing their rights and freedoms. Nonetheless a social order is established with those who entered into the covenant. Now Hobbes says that the minority of outsiders is in trouble. A society has much more power compared to the individual, so at the end, the society could overpower and destroy the remaining individuals within the region, or the society can force them into entering into the covenant as well. Now it must be elucidated what kind of act of forcing is in question here. Note that Hobbes considers only physical bondage and impediments to movement as restrictive of freedom. For instance, it does not annul the freedom of the

individual even if there is a life-threatening situation. Consequently the more powerful society can threaten the outsider individuals to partake in the covenant by force, but this does not mean their renunciation is not voluntary. Similar to the previous set of circumstances, it is in the freedom of the individual to choose death and destruction over complying with a covenant.

In order to push the Hobbesian formulation to its limit with respect to voluntary renunciation, it can be useful to imagine a situation with a little bit of absurdity in regards to partaking in the covenant. Consider that partaking in the covenant is embodied in the act of signing one's initials on a piece of document. The more powerful society, then, physically forces the outsider individuals to sign the document, by literally holding them down on the ground and pushing their arms and hand to sign. Although this act of signing embodies the individuals accession into covenant, can it really be considered a true act of partaking in the covenant?

I think this question can be answered through the technical details of the making of the covenant, as does Hobbes in many of his responses. Partaking in the covenant means that the individual renounces its rights and freedoms. In other words the individuals must be in a position where he/ she has right to everything and is free do to as he/ she pleases. Only then it is possible to renounce them. So the problem becomes clarified. Do these physically forced signatories have their rights and freedoms as they had them in their natural state?

All in all considering Hobbes' views on renunciation, there seems to be a definitive contradiction to Waltz's claim that peace is the result of, not a voluntary, but a forced renunciation. This is because at every turn in Hobbes' formulation it is encountered that the act of renunciation has to be performed out of volition.

Renunciation is necessarily a voluntary act, in other words it cannot be forced. So it seems Waltz is mistaken in the eyes of Hobbes.

At this moment the discussion needs to be taken to two different directions. In one direction lies an attempt to reconcile the contradiction between the ideas of Waltz and Hobbes; while the other direction leads to a discussion regarding the issues that emerge when we try to adapt the Hobbesian thinking of the establishment of society to an international scale. The former direction will take the discussion towards the Hobbesian understanding of peace which although is the result of a voluntary renunciation, may require force for its continuation. In the latter direction rises a question asking that what would constitute an act of renunciation in the international system? These two paths are on a certain level interrelated. So I will first explore the former path and attempt to come to terms with both Waltz and Hobbes with respect to the concept of renunciation.

It has been shown that Hobbes regards the act of renunciation as voluntary, even under life-threatening dire conditions. So contrary to Waltz's statement, peace turns out to be the result of a voluntary renunciation. But what about the continuation of the existence of the conditions of peace? It may be the case that the conditions of peace are laid down through a voluntary renunciation, but it is possible that its continuation may not depend on the voluntary compliance of the subjects of the society. So now I will try to explore whether peace is sustained through force.

Hobbes' concept of state of nature was equivalent to a state of war. For Hobbes a state of war should not be taken to be a state of active fighting against a certain enemy. State of war is a state of war because the individual therein does not have a sense of safety at all and must be alert and prepared for an attack from any possible direction on his life or belongings. An analogy Hobbes provides is very explanatory. State of

war is like weather, one knows that it's the rainy season and that there are heavy clouds, so one feels it necessary to prepare for rain even though it is not currently raining. Therefore the state of war is a state of affairs where persons do not have any sense of security and constantly feel under threat; the possibility of attacks on one's life or belongings is ever-present.

It can be considered possible derive and discuss the concept of peace from Hobbes' conception of state of war. If the state of war is the set of circumstances where dangerous attacks from every other person are an ever-present possibility, then the cancellation of this possibility should lead us to peace. If the set of circumstances whereby one lives provide a sense of security from possible attacks to my life or belongings from any other person, then there is peace. Peace means that a person no longer needs to be prepared and alert for dangers posed by other persons. This is what is precisely aimed at, when persons come together, renounce their rights to everything and unbridled freedoms through the voluntary making of a covenant, which results in the emergence of the sovereign.

Until here the issue has been discussed and explained above. The crucial point that interests us at this moment concerns the very existence of the sovereign. If people are capable of voluntarily giving up their rights and freedoms in order to attain a peaceful co-existence, then why is the presence of the sovereign necessary? This is because the continuation of the peaceful order depends on deterrence. The sovereign has unbridled power to sustain peace and order through laws it lays down. So the power of the sovereign and its laws take up role of a deterring factor in case any of the parties to the covenant harbors intentions to violate the agreement by attacking or robbing other parties. Although renouncing their rights and freedoms, individuals are still capable of targeting others and their belongings –which would constitute a crime,

doubtlessly, but it is not a part of the discussion here. So, the sovereign deters any potential disturbers of peace through fear and force, to which Hobbes calls awe. It must be noted that even in the face of awe and force, a person is free to choose to resort to violence and disturb the peace. Therefore at the end the potential disturber gives up on his plots voluntarily.

However there is a difference between these two voluntary actions. Voluntarily giving up on peace-disturbing plots is not the same as voluntarily giving up one's rights and freedoms to partake in the covenant. In the former, the person is a subject of a society while in the other he/ she is completely free in nature. It is also important to note the fact that the parties to the covenant gave up their rights and freedoms in the process. Then it is possible to conclude that a subject is not as free as a person in the state of nature. Freedom was exchanged for peace. As a token of this fact, the sovereign's right to imprison people as long as it wishes is very telling.

Consequently it can be claimed that there is the factor of forcing people into peaceful order within Hobbes' theory. This factor of force accounts for the need to sustain the peace. Although it emerged through the voluntary renunciation of persons in the state of nature, peace requires the existence of force to be kept standing. So, despite being not very compatible with Waltz's statement about peace being the result of only forced renunciation, in Hobbes, too, the crucial necessity of force in keeping the peace can be found. It would not be far-fetched to consider this, then, a mid-point between Waltz's and Hobbes' views. Emergence of peace may not depend on a forceful renunciation but its sustaining requires force.

It should be kept in mind that when Hobbes discusses the concept of renunciation it concerns the formation of a civil society, while Waltz's statement relates to the discussion of international society. So it is important to assess the

adaptability of Hobbes' idea to the realist conception of an international society. If the state of affairs of international politics is compared to the state of nature, is it permissible to make the case of a voluntary renunciation by an independent country? Can countries renounce their rights to everything and their freedoms (in which case independencies)? To such a question, it seems, Hobbes' response would be in the negative. As he explains the sovereign's rights, Hobbes emphasizes the fact that the sovereign is incapable of abdicating its power and authority over its subjects because the sovereign is outside the social covenant (Hobbes 1985, 230-1). The sovereign cannot forfeit his authority because this authority strictly depends on the contract made by the individuals persons which declared their renunciation of rights and freedoms and obedience to the one who is to be the sovereign. Since the sovereign is not the sovereign on his own account, it cannot declare a renunciation of its own rights and freedoms to a, say, supranational authority. Such a renunciation would be null in the eyes of its subjects. Hence the null-conception of international society in terms of Hobbes.

2.3. Realist Conclusion: A Null-Conception of International Society

In this chapter the realist views on the concept of international society has been discussed with Thomas Hobbes' and Kenneth Waltz's theoretical works constituting the focal point of discussion. Hobbes' ideas relied on the inherent selfishness of human beings and the absolute necessity of an authority figure to manage the selfish humans. The discussion has tried to deal with the technical and terminological details of Hobbes' contractual theory; the implications of which can be seen illuminating from an international relations perspective. For Hobbes the arrival of a domestic society is the result of the search for an escape from the state of nature, which is a state of war, and

to attain peaceful conditions of living. Hobbes asserts that the state of war is ever-present and always intimidating because human beings have a fundamental equality with respect to harming each other fatally because each and every one of them is vulnerable due to hunger, sleep and diseases. So no one in the state of nature can assure himself/herself of their safety. However this is not exactly the matter in the international relations, where independent states are not so similar to the individuals in the state of nature. Sleep, hunger and diseases which make people equally vulnerable in the state of nature are not an issue for states even if we assume the parallelism between the international condition and the state of nature. In other words the independent states of the international system lack even the foundational incentive to end the international anarchy as an ever-present space of insecurity. Hence the idea of international society remains a null-conception which does not bear actuality.

In the second part of the discussion in this chapter, the subject-matter was the investigation of Waltz's theories in terms of the concept of international society. The focal point in discussing Waltz was the relationship between war and social order. If the prevention of war is taken to be a fundamental step towards the establishment of a social order, an investigation into the reasons of war would demonstrate the obstructions in way of establishing an international society. Waltz's discussion of war surveys the general arguments as to why war occurs in three categories, or as he calls them, three images. Wars occur, first because human nature is predisposed to conflict, second because the internal structures of states are predisposed thereto, and finally because of the international anarchy. The second part of the study discussed Waltz's investigation of the three images and his argument that the international anarchy constitute the fundamental reason behind the occurrence of wars. Waltz' two suggestions to thwart wars from happening has also been discussed and it was

concluded that these two suggestions end up being fundamentally the same thing and rely on the eradication of international anarchy through a supranational power. So the realist discussion of this study concludes that ultimately the existence of international anarchy makes the actualization of an international society impossible, hence remains international society a null-conception.

CHAPTER 3

LIBERALISM: INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS A FUNCTIONAL- INSTITUTIONAL SOCIETY

Liberal thinking differs fundamentally from the realist one, not only in content but also in style. If realism is a theory of diagnosis than liberalism would be a theory of prognosis. The difference between them overarches theoretical debates and is apparent in terms of meta-theory. Realism assumes what people are, liberalism assumes what people will be. In a way liberalism seems to be adopting solutions that are pinpointed by the realists, that of state structure and international anarchy. Their only difference in assumptions is of the capacities of the human nature and the nature of anarchy. So in this chapter of the study, the liberal views in regard to the concept of international society will be discussed. The main topics of discussion will be the views of Kant as a classical thinker, and Charles Beitz and John Rawls as modern thinkers of liberalism. But, first a general outline of the liberal thinking will be presented in order to better situate the views of Kant, Beitz and Rawls. Kant's thought will provide moral foundation for liberal conception of international society while Beitz and Rawls will provide more concrete technical conceptions for the discussion within the part

called Contractarian Tradition. The purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate the way that liberal view conceives of international society as a functional and institutional conception which can be actualized through collective endeavor of peoples and nations.

3.1. A Brief Overview of Liberalism

The outlook of liberalism can be glimpsed at, for instance, in Smith's title to his article "Liberalism and International Reform." Liberal idea is about change and reform as opposed to realist idea of understanding what something is. Smith remarks that liberal idea of reform has not been influential in international politics as much as it has been in domestic politics (Smith, 201). If we take a closer look as to why this has been the case, liberals and realist would provide their different explanation. As discussed above realist outlook is that the international relations constitute an object of study, similar to nitric acid of chemistry. Realist aim to study and understand the 'nature' of international politics. For them policy means maneuvers that help one survive in the circumstances of international arena, comparable to a survival expert in a desert. On the other hand liberals do not have such a rigid view of international relations. It is not a natural phenomenon independent of human desire, understanding and practice, rather, it depends on them. If human beings desire something different, understand what they desire and practice accordingly international politics is susceptible to change and development. This is the liberal cause. Their focus is on how to change the way things are. This approach parallel to Kant's deontology. It is significant to remember Kant's formula, what something is, does not indicate what that thing ought to be. Liberals succeeded to a considerable degree in restraining political power within the state, so they believe it is also possible in international politics (Smith, 202). In contrast to realists, liberals believe human nature to be

innocuous. However the most important tenet of liberal theory is human reason. Reason can change politics.

Consequently liberals do not consider war a natural part of international politics. Dickinson writes, “War is not a fatal product of human nature; it is an effect of that nature when out under certain conditions.” This claim implies that if we can change the existing order and provide different circumstances in international relations, human beings will not be disposed to conflict and war will cease to exist. Human beings’ primary tool in this venture is none other than reason. Reason not only an instrument to change our environment but also our power to control our emotions and impulses that may lead to war. A significant view is of Kant. He thinks that human beings have a “unsocial sociability” which indicates our conflictual temperament about desiring to be free and inclined to live in a society. Kant does not regard human beings’ greedy features as only capable of evil but as a part of our nature that also gives way to cultural and rational development. At the final stage, Kant believes human beings will end up establishing peaceful conditions, because they will eventually comprehend the perils of war, probably after suffering gravely (Kant 1991b).

In the liberal tradition there is another branch which leans towards a more consequentialist approach as opposed to Kantian deontological view. Kant was hopeful in reason’s triumph and arrival of peace, but he believed there was a long way to go. Utilitarians, on the other hand, was much more optimistic and considered peace almost arrived. It may be helpful to take a brief look at a utilitarian approach in order to understand the Kantian one in the posterity.

Jeremy Bentham considered war irrational. To him cooperation seems always more advantageous to humankind. He sketched a *Plan for a Universal and Perpetual*

Peace in order to demonstrate the way to a future without turmoil. Therein he makes two propositions for a new order. First is to pursue a worldwide disarmament in which all nations of the world are to reduce their military power. Second is for the colonial powers, demanding the “emancipation of all distant dependencies.” Peace requires absence of armaments and colonies (Bentham 1843, prop XII). What should be encouraged to flourish is commerce. Bentham argues that international trade is more beneficial in every aspect than war. Another utilitarian John Stuart Mill argues for commerce as well. For him commerce was becoming the new venue of contact between nations, replacing war. The profits of trade pulling human beings away from the perils of war (ibid).

Liberalism has ideas about international interventions, a very relevant concept to society. Among liberals, there are branches debating about intervention to another state in order to spread liberal values (Smith 2004, 212). Those who argue against interventionism simply champion the idea of becoming an example for others as the best way to promote liberal cause. Mill, on the other hand, gives a little more detailed account. He believes that if the country in question is under a foreign invasion, caught up in the greed of another country, it is just to intervene and fend off the invaders. However if the country in question is in turmoil due to internal strife, for example, tyranny, then other countries should stay away and leave it to itself. Internal conflict can only be resolved within (Smith 2004, 213-4). In these ideas it is easy recognize the liberal essence. Just as in domestic societies that states are restrained from interfering with individual freedoms, Mill conjectures an international society in which the internal affairs of states are not meddled with. Here we are also able to see the Kantian respect.

Different from Beitzian contractarianism liberals regard states as subjects of international society and their proxy as necessary. Their view is more obvious in their arguments about international organizations. Also we can infer here that liberals do not observe a distinction among domestic and international politics in their theoretical framework. Liberalism propose that states should structure their internal politics in accordance with liberal democratic doctrines which ensure individual rights and freedoms while they should abide by international law and participate in international and regional organizations, restricting their own sovereignty voluntarily (Smith 2004, 215). United Nations and League of Nations are exemplary results of these liberal ideas. Notable there is problem similar to chicken and egg one.

The prioritization of international reforms over domestic ones or vice versa is up to debate among liberals. For example Woodrow Wilson emphasizes domestic reform asserting that the only free nations are eligible for participation in the League. For him only the nations whose government is the result of the will and vote of its people are free and therefore proper for the League. Because otherwise autocratic governments cannot be entrusted with the peace and security of world (Smith 2004, 216).

On the other hand there are some others emphasizing the priority of international reform so that international obstacles to domestic reforms are dealt with. For example international anarchy compels nations to adopt or at least take into account more belligerent policies and cautions and prevents them from having a moment of peaceful transition to pacific attitudes and policies. Kant seems to champion a interdependent reciprocal process between the international and the domestic while many other liberals are ambiguous (Smith 2004, 216).

3.2. Kant

I believe talking about Kant first is necessary for discerning his differences from Rousseau and laying the grounds for the discussion of Liberalism in IR. Kant is interested in the actions and motives of individual human beings. For him human beings are distinctively rational beings which renders them moral agents (Donaldson 2004, 136). Rationality provides human beings with freedom; it is the freedom from the coercions of nature and therefore being able to choose what to do. Freedom comes with moral responsibility, hence the human beings as moral agents.

Kant puts forward the idea of categorical imperative which is to be the kernel of a human being's moral code. It obliges that human beings treat each other as ends in themselves in contrast to as means, and this treatment should be in accordance with principles that bear universal validity (Donaldson 2004, 137). Kant maintains that the source of the categorical imperative is reason. It is reason that determines what categorical imperative is and whether an action is compatible with it. By employing reason the human being can ask whether a moral principal is universally valid; the affirmation of this question leads to the formation of a principle of the categorical imperative. The idea that the categorical imperative compels human beings to regard each other as ends in themselves not a means and that the compulsion of the categorical imperative is in itself universally valid, counter the moral approach of consequentialism, which suggests that the moral value of an act lies in its consequences. So the difference is that the categorical imperative compels you to act in a certain way regardless of the consequences, for instance, no matter what, you must always tell the truth. But consequentialism requires one to calculate according to certain principles which are subject to change, and if, for example, telling a lie seems more valuable at that very moment than telling the truth, moral consequentialism

compels you to lie. However Kant does not believe in calculating consequences or interests when assessing an action's moral value, Kant calls this empiricism in morality and he is strictly against it. Moral value is discovered through the use of reason, just as the rules of geometry can be mentally perceived (Donaldson 2004, 138). The laws of nature and that of social life are not disparate: "Two things are unceasing sources of awe for men: the starry heavens above us and the moral law within us" (Kant 2002, 203). These words are very telling with respect to Kant's approach to universe in general and to morality in particular. Kant believes that there are moral laws beyond time and space, and culture in this case as well, the same way there are laws of Euclidian geometry or of Newtonian physics valid in everywhere and at all times. While this view of parallelism itself is subject to a fervent debate, it is tragic that two centuries later, in the 20th century, it was demonstrated that the Euclidian geometry and the Newtonian physics are not as universally valid as Kant once thought. This debate would be a digression at the moment, so I will return to discussing Kant's categorical imperative.

One of the problems of Kant's categorical imperative is the specification of generality (Donaldson, 140). Too general a maxim would be inapplicable while a too specific one loses its quality as a principle. Kantian interpretations maintain that the maxim should be considered general under "relatively similar conditions" (Donaldson, 140).

In his opposition to empiricism in morality Kant embraces a view contrary to Hobbes's theory of society. Remember that Hobbes considered the establishment of society dependent on the desire for security of individuals. There were no rules, laws or morality in the state of nature aside from survival and self-protection. However since state of nature is a state of war security of each person is very contingent and

fleeing. A covenant that obliges people to voluntarily renounce their freedom in exchange for participation in society and creating the sovereign, brings about the security by abolishing the state of war among individuals. In short, we can claim that, for Hobbes, establishment of society is a pragmatic initiative, calculated and assessed on the basis of consequences. Here though it seems important to analyze a certain idea of Hobbes in *Leviathan* so that our understanding of his pragmatism is clear. Hobbes considers the state of nature without morality and law, but it is not completely lawless. Hobbes enumerates two fundamental laws of nature: the first law is “that every man ought to endeavor Peace as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of Warre;” and the second law which derives from the first is “that a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary to lay down his right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe” (Hobbes, 190). The crucial matter here is the significance of these laws. This is confusing because Hobbes informs us that law is civil law and civil law is the command of the sovereign of a society (Hobbes 1985, 313). Since the state of nature is the opposite of society, how can there be laws? Gauthier discusses this extensively, in the framework of three possible interpretations of these laws of nature: as theorems of reason, as divine commands and as civil law (Gauthier 2001, 259). His conclusion is that Hobbes uses them neither as divine commands nor as a civil law but as theorems of reason (Gauthier 2001, 259). Gauthier grounds his argument mainly on these sentences in *Leviathan* “These dictates of reason men use to call by the name of laws, but improperly; for they are but conclusions or theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves, whereas law, properly, is the word of him that by right hath command over others”

(Hobbes, 216-7). So the laws of nature are definitely different from a civil law, which is the command of the sovereign. It can be added to this that Hobbes considers the laws of nature as an obligation “*in foro interno*”, that is, their influence is about the intentions and desires, the inner drives of human action (Hobbes 1985, 215); in other words they are more like a matter of the heart. However if we regard these laws of nature as theorems of reason, we may risk interpreting them as principles similar to Kantian categorical imperative, discovered through reason as a moral compass. In order to avoid this, a careful examination of Hobbes’ laws of nature would suffice. Even during the declaration of the first law of nature, Hobbes reminds us that, prior to the social formation, we are in a state of war and that we should avail ourselves of every means imaginable to defend ourselves, since everybody has a right to everything. Also he does not forgo emphasizing the question of possibility, by saying “as farre as he has hope.” And in the second law of nature we are suggested that we should consider renouncing our rights to everything on the condition that others are also intent to do so. As it can be seen, both of these fundamental laws of nature are strictly surrounded by empirical facts and calculations. So we can conclude that Hobbes’s view of morality and law is more akin to a consequentialist one, in very much opposition to Kant’s. Hence the stark difference between Hobbes’ laws of nature and the Kantian categorical imperative.

Going back to Kant’s ideas, he, first of all, rejects the Hobbes’ assumption that human beings are by nature selfish and that moral imperatives do not exist in the state of nature where there are no laws or security. Since the source of morality is reason, and reason is a faculty of human beings irrespective of the state of affairs they are in, Kant suggests that people are bound by moral code under any circumstances. More primarily, the way Kant theorizes about the world is different from that of Hobbes. As

Donaldson puts it, even if Kant agreed on the assumption of human selfishness he would disagree on Hobbes' arguments because "he believed the way the world *is* cannot be used to derive the way it *ought* to be" [emphasis original] (Donaldson, 141). For Kant, the current status of things are not absolute and they do not necessarily constitute conditions that restrict our theorization about the world. People may be selfish currently, but this does not impact the way they ideally should be. The way Hobbes thinks is based on figuring out how things are and suggesting to act accordingly. As I tried to explain above, Hobbes suggests that we take into account the circumstances and calculate our next step according to the possible consequences. Hobbes believes that we are subjected to the state of things. However Kant attempts to go beyond the state of things and ponders ways to transform them into a *reasonable and ideal* status, "what is incumbent on us as a duty is rather to act in conformity with the Idea of that end [perpetual peace], even if there is not the slightest theoretical likelihood that it can be realized, as long as its impossibility cannot demonstrated either" (Kant 1991, 160). In the same manner, he only considers empiricism or practical calculations with respect to their inability to show that something is impossible (Donaldson 2004, 147). This is because even if the current state of affairs is not conducive to the realization of certain ideals, it is not impossible to change the current state into one that is conducive as such. This perspective of Kant's in pursuing the ideal even it seems impossible is important in the liberal theory of IR.

In accordance with the idea of universal morality Kant envisions a cosmopolitan world (Donaldson 2004, 142). The moral code derived from reason will be the same code wherever or by whomever it is theorized because reason is common to every human being irrespective to culture, geography or nationality. Creating a common realm for all by cooperation and the making of proper laws is the moral duty

of states. Donaldson lists three conceptions that Kant takes into account for his cosmopolitan ideal: regarding states as a moral agent, the original common ownership of the earth and its resources, and the endeavor for perpetual peace (Donaldson 2004, 145). Kant considers state as a moral agent because he thinks that states have reason and freedom as well, and these qualities bring moral responsibility.

First, Kant considers states as moral agents. For him the state of nature, as the state of war, is further from justice, hence it is a moral duty to make peace by covenants. Here the difference between the starting points of Kant and Hobbes is stark, since the former considers covenanting a moral duty while the latter a reasonable act resulting from calculation. States are also under the same moral obligation of making peace as well (Donaldson 2004, 146). They must institute law among nations and form a confederacy. But, important to keep in mind that here the obligation does not derive from the idea that collaboration of states would be beneficial to the whole world, Kant is not a consequentialist, unlike Bentham and others who propose similar frameworks for peace but on consequentialist accounts, which will be addressed below. Kant's propositions and concerns always stem from the categorical imperative. The states must achieve peace because it is simply the right thing to do. The form of the social contract that states are obliged to make in Kant's vision is of relevance to our discussion in this study.

First of all, when Kant speaks of states creating a confederacy he does not consider states as the only subjects under the confederacy. For Kant, a supranational social contract relates both to states and to individuals within those states. It encompasses the relationship of states to each other, of individuals to individuals in different states and of individuals to other states (Kant 1991, 123). Hence the cosmopolitan understanding. Kant envisions a world society without eliminating the

existence of states. Prominently Kant does not propose the establishment of a world government to oversee the confederacy. It is instituted and operated through the voluntary participation and action of states, which are also free to leave the confederacy. By virtue of this, Kant aims to preserve states' right to protect themselves (Donaldson, 145). Accordingly, war is only just when it is in self-defense. However Donaldson remarks that the concept of self-defense is left open to a degree that can justify preemptive strike in the name of defense (Donaldson 2004, 146). In short we can say that this is what Kant conceives of states as free and rational and therefore bound by morality in the first conception of his cosmopolitan ideal.

Before discussing the second conception it is important to talk about the idea of volition in Kant's first conception. The Kantian world-wide confederacy is established and sustained by states voluntarily, there is no super power that forces them to cooperate. This is the evident result of regarding states as moral agents. Morality presupposes voluntariness. We also saw how Kant allocates a position to the institution of war in this confederacy. War is still a right of states, so that they can protect themselves in case of danger and threat. Even preemptive strike can be justified as a defensive resort to war. However it is well known in the study of international relations that just reasons for war, are easily and more often than not abused and used as pretext for unjust actions. For this reason many theorists we talked about above, such as Machiavelli and Morgenthau are opposed to mixing morality into the affairs of war. war should remain amoral so that moral causes cannot be exploited by warmongers. Kant's difference is that he never considers affairs of human beings, about whatever they be, free from moral considerations. Therefore the resort to war as a moral affair is subject to volition. States are free to choose to go to war as long as they believe their resort to war is in self-defense. However much exploitable this may seem, it is in

congruity with Kantian precepts that presupposes moral duty and voluntary compliance together. Notably, this understanding of voluntary action is very telling of the distinction between the liberal and the realist approach, if we remember the words of Waltz above “In anarchy there is no automatic harmony,” expressing that peace is a result of a forced renunciation of powers, not voluntary.

Kant’s second conception given above regarding the original common ownership of the earth is significant in terms of economic and commercial activities. He claims that the original ownership justifies initiatives for international trade and laying down appropriate rules that secures and regulates the inter-state conduct, because this ownership does not lose its validity after social contracts and demarcation of countries (Donaldson 2004, 146). Kant’s claim relies on the understanding that the planet earth as the plain and resource of our lives and sustenance belongs originally to all human beings. For instance a person who lives in an area where there is no coffee cultivation has every right to have access to the coffee produced in some part of the world. Countries, borders, customs etc. are mere artificial lines and regulations which cannot restrict the original ownership of the world by all human beings. Therefore a person’s right to freely trade with another on the other side of the world is to be respected. Hence the basis of free trade for Kant. In spite of borders people should be able to freely engage in commercial activities.

The third is the simplest but the most striking of the conceptions which is the obligation to endeavor for perpetual peace. It is striking because Kant regards it as a moral duty and censures those who make attempts for thwarting the progression of it. In the same context Kant depicts an “unjust enemy” as one who embraces a principle which, if becomes universal, can obstruct the universal peace (Donaldson 2004, 146). This conception is very similar in idea to the Hobbesian first law of nature declaring

that one should seek to establish peace with others and leave the state of nature. However the intensity of obligation in their respective principles are stark. While Hobbes' law of nature depends on circumstantial calculation, as we talked about, Kant's principle is a universal moral duty which condemns those who principally make efforts against it as "unjust enemies." For Hobbes everyone is an enemy and you are advised to make peace with only those who are also willing to enter into a covenant. For Kant, on the other hand, the only enemy is that who embraced a principal universally antithetical to the principal of endeavoring for universal peace. It is as if Hobbes advising us to choose our friends wisely since everybody is an enemy while Kant urges us to pick out our enemies morally since we are obliged to seek befriending everybody.

Kant's understanding of peace bears important connections with his cosmopolitan ideal. Being bereft of conflict or enmity in international relations does not suffice for peace (Kant 1991b, 98). Even with the hostile atmosphere is dissolved, peace must be upheld by institutions and rules (Forde 2004, 148). Hence Nardin concludes that Kantian peace is not a natural state of being but a juridical one (Nardin 1983, 283-4). Kant's conception of peace is in concordance with his idea of confederacy. The subjects, be them states or individuals, must constantly aim at preserving peace and act in accordance with the categorical imperative. Peace is more like a practice than a system. Formulation of principles and establishment of institutions are not sufficient, continual practice and active sustainment of them is essential. Hence its relation to practical reason for Kant.

Despite his optimistic propositions Kant himself is in a conundrum regarding the efficacy of international law in the absence of sanctions. As we have seen, Kant does not include a supranational authority over the world's nations. However he does

not disregard the practical difficulty of having nations follow the rules without external enforcement. He disagrees with those who make a case for international law such as Grotius, Pufendorf or Vattel (Donaldson 2004, 148). He regards their legal code as such that they “do not and cannot have the slightest legal force, since states as such are not subject to a common external constraint” (Kant 1991b, 103).

3.3. Contractarian Tradition

I will discuss contractarian theories under the title of Liberalism since it is prevalent among Liberals (Mapel 2004, 185). The first step in contractarianism is the setting up of the “circumstances of justice.” This term indicates the state of affairs in which justice holds meaning. The term is formulated by David Hume regarding the significance of justice (Hume, 3:1, Vanderschraaf 2006, 323). Then it is reinterpreted and conceptualized by Rawls, who is a significant figure among contractarians and here for us. Rawls defines the “circumstances of justice” as “the normal conditions under which human cooperation is possible and necessary” (Rawls 1999, 109). If these conditions are met the institutions upholding and sustaining justice can be established and practiced. For Rawls “interdependence, vulnerability, moderate scarcity of goods, limited generosity and roughly equal capacities and aptitudes comprise the basic circumstances of justice” in question (Mapel, 182). Elucidating each of these terms should provide clarification about the idea of the circumstances of justice.

It is necessary that people are vulnerable to environment and to each other, “or at any rate, their capacities are comparable in that no one among them can dominate the rest” (Rawls 1999, 110). If human beings were immune and impenetrable to the forces of nature including the threats of other human beings they would be able to fare sufficiently alone. Vulnerability is, therefore, a prerequisite. To elaborate, having

roughly equal capacities and aptitudes is a required condition because only then people can be concerned with proportionate distribution of resources and cooperation. Moreover, if there was an inherent difference of capacity among human beings the preponderance of the stronger over the weaker would impede social consolidation. Also when their capacity and aptitude is on a roughly equal level they are subjected to the forces of nature equally, in other words, their vulnerability is on equal levels. It can also be claimed that this is influential in eliciting empathy. So having roughly equal capacities and aptitudes is a prerequisite for justice to matter. This prerequisite can be found in the form of assumptions in many other political thinkers. For example Hobbes, too, assumes that people are equal in their capacities in the state of nature. Equality among individuals is important because it brings about sociopolitical uncertainty since no one is powerful enough to hold sway over others and therefore this brings about the necessity of establishing order among individuals. If we consider the social formation in this perspective, establishing order means none other than creating an asymmetry of power. Equality in capacities is broken by the social contract and the creation of an authority. The state or the government, as an entity in the society, is superior to individuals and other groups in terms of capacity and hence possesses the power to ensure order. Otherwise, suppose that, individuals are not roughly equal in their capacities and there are some people who have considerably higher capacities, the stronger would be reluctant to cooperate and share resources for they are better off on their own or they even attempt to seize control over others. So, again, a rough equality among individuals is a prerequisite.

“There is the condition of moderate scarcity understood to cover a wide range of situations” (Rawls 1999, 110). The resources for livelihood should not be abundant either, so that people would have to cooperate and be in a kind of agreement for

proportionate usage and distribution of these resources. Amount of resources for human livelihood is an important factor that influences the relationship among people. Too richly resourceful an environment would not elicit competition among agents. There would be everything enough for everybody. Without competition the threat posed by individuals to one another would diminish. The interaction in the forms of conflict and cooperation would decrease. As a result the relevance of justice would vanish. So a moderate scarcity of goods is also a prerequisite for justice. Additionally, it is to be noted that the scarcity is limited as moderate because, more obviously, a serious level of scarcity would destroy any possibility of coherent and sustainable social order.

Considering the first two circumstances we can infer that a level of interdependence is required. Justice is in the most basic terms, a social concept. It is only as relevant a concept as the concept of society is. So it is a concern only when people are living under such conditions that they have to relate to and depend on each other. Such conditions are only guaranteed when dependence and cooperation is a necessity for sustaining their livelihood. Therefore justice requires an interdependent group of people.

Limited generosity, or in other words, a certain level of selfishness, is necessary so that people want things for themselves and depend on each other as individuals in order to reproduce the society as a means for individual interest; "...they nevertheless have their own plans of life These plans, or conceptions of the good, lead them to have different ends and purposes, and to make conflicting claims on the natural and social resources available" (Rawls 1999, 110). If people were too good-natured and highly generous, resources would be distributed as equally as possible without any competition or discussion. No rules, no regulations and no restrictions would be

necessary to organize the community. Consequently, the concept of justice could not be a relevant topic to discuss for them. A limited generosity or, as I regard more relatable to speak of, a certain level of selfishness immediately leads to self-interest. Self-interest means one chooses his or her own needs and acquirements over another's. This constitutes the basis for competition and therefore cooperation. When people compete with each other they could prefer grouping in order to increase their advantage and such grouping would definitely require terms, conditions and regulations to protect the groups' inner integrity. At this point justice becomes a relevant matter for these groups. So limited generosity is a prerequisite. I may remark that the necessity of limited generosity can be related to securing personhood of individuals.

Consequently, for Rawls, neither justice would mean something concrete nor the institutions and practices that aim at exercising justice would emerge if these circumstances are inexistent. Circumstances of justice brings relevance to justice. As a result, our discussion of the concept of society in international relations will relate to the concept of circumstances of justice in contractarian thought. Whether they are translatable to international society and wherein whether justice can be relevant will be the core of this part. But first the conclusive discussions explaining the workings of the contractarian argument is necessary.

Mapel lays out how contractarian arguments work in general (Mapel 2004, 184). According to him contractarians are not in favor of grounding their theories on consequentialist approaches. Moral principles have priority, much like what we see in Kant's view. Also contractarian arguments have a basis in individual rights as Hobbes, Rousseau etc. describe –remember the emphasis above on limited generosity as a basis for individuality. Thus utilitarian and consequentialist schemas are also rejected.

However this does not mean the importance of consequences are completely ruled out. Mapel stresses that contractarian theories should include a theory of rational choice in order to explain the acceptance of some rules and institutions among the participants of the contract. We are informed that there are two general tendencies of theories of rational choice: minimizing harm among participants or maximizing goods or options in under the social contract, former indicating a classical approach while the latter a contemporary one. On the other hand Rawls combines these two approaches into “maximizing the minimum” sharing of goods among the participants of the society in question (Mapel 2004, 185).

Another significant point in the contractarian approach is that they are hesitant about prescribing final ends for the participating individuals. This hesitation rests on two reasons, one is theoretical while the other is practical. Theoretically, the participators are not agents working towards the same concrete goal, rather, they are private persons who keep their rights and are responsible for certain duties. Therefore contractarians respect the individuals’ wishes regarding their own outcomes, that is, they have autonomy. The practical reason, on the other hand, is their pessimism about the possibility of reaching any agreement regarding final ends. Contractarians are skeptical about whether individuals are likely to achieve a consensus about a common goal. The best common final end that individuals can agree on is “a more or less extensive set of instrumental goods, the chief of which is some form of political society” (Mapel 2004, 185). In this case, it is said that envisioning a concrete common end for the members of an international society is even harder, because therein, interests of individual states are much more divergent and varying. The most ubiquitous view in this topic is that states can at best agree on the rule of law that regulates international procedures.

Rawlsian circumstances of justice is integral to his idea original position. The original position is a hypothetical situation where we imagine individuals are in a pre-social state (Rawls 1999, 103). Its significance is to posit individuals in a situation where they are morally induced in their actions (Rawls 1999, 104). Such a conception is necessary in order to lay down a set of conditions in which people can act without prejudices that come from already being part of a society such as profession, social class etc.. Vitally important to this end, Rawls also provides a concept named “the veil of ignorance.” The veil of ignorance corresponds to the decision-making process conducted by individuals without taking into account the possible benefits of the outcome of a decision to their own persons (Rawls 1999, 11). They should make a decision behind the veil, that is, without considering what they really are and what are their personal interests. If individuals can manage to partake in the decision-making process in such a manner, they would have to think of the possibility that they can be anyone, so their deliberation rests on a highly inclusive and sociable fashion. A simple example could be about work safety measures. If a person attends the meeting that shall decide whether or not the implementation of work safety measure be compulsory, and in his attendance regards the possibility that he can both be the business owner and the worker in that business, he would be able to conclude that the life of a person is more important than a some increase in the profits. Because he himself can be very well that worker.

Charles Beitz, on the other hand, tries to apply Rawlsian contract theory to international relations. Before advancing his theory, Beitz criticizes Hobbesian realism claiming that Hobbes equates states of nature of individuals to that of states on four analogies which are invalid for the current international sphere: “(1) actors of a single kind; (2) with relatively equal power; (3) who are independent of each other; and (4)

with no reliable expectations of reciprocal compliance in the absence of a common superior” (Mapel 2004, 191). In other words the Hobbesian analogy only works if states are the only actors which have relatively equal capacities just as the individuals in the Hobbesian state of nature and if the internal affairs of each state is independent of each other while also these states cannot engage in reciprocal obligations without enforcement. In contrast, respectively, there are non-state actors which are not to be underestimated in their effectivity, there is definitely no equality of power among actors and there is a considerably high degree of interdependence which rests itself upon a certain reciprocity existing even without any common and higher authority. Beitz’s rejection of individual-state analogy continues in a second move. He rejects the idea that assumes state as a moral agent (Beitz 1999, 52). This rejection will avail him in determining the participators of his international contract. State, according to Beitz, merely is a condition for individuals to flourish, one that is not irreplaceable.

Beitz’s intention is to finally reach a stage of international justice that state loses its privilege as the sole condition of individual welfare. To this end, he considers Rawlsian veil of ignorance is functional. The concept of the veil of ignorance means that in a contract, participators make their decisions with limited information. This limitation encompasses the information related to participators’ personal interests, identities and positions in the society, so that individual decision-making process do not purpose their own advantages (Rawls 1999, 11). The significance and benefit of this is that the matters of public discussion remain free of personal gains and restricted to matters of public common interest. This is an important idea in Rawls’ theory of justice in the sense that it allows avoidance of processes of reconciliation among participants through discussions about their personal interests. In such discussions the consensus is mostly achieved when the personal interests of a majority align. Rawls’

blow is against this idea of utilitarianism. Serving the personal interests of the majority does not necessarily correspond to serving the interest of public. Therefore, according to Rawls in a just society people must treat the public as a separate party whose interest should be considered separately. This separate consideration takes place only if the participants manage to leave their personal issues aside. The veil of ignorance indicates this necessity. By figuratively wearing the veil of ignorance people will engage in public consideration without their private considerations.

The ultimate impact of such a perspective in international relations is that individuals become the sole subjects of international society without relevance to his or her nationality (Mapel 2004, 193). As Rawls said, in thinking under such uniform conditions and without private considerations it is rational to endeavor for maximization of the minimum standards for all, in case one turns out to be the least advantageous of all participators. After all when one thinks in such self-disregarding fashion he or she must take into account the possibility that they might be the most disadvantageous participant in this society. For instance, in a public discussion about health care policies if everybody considers, in their public deliberation, the likelihood that they can be in a position of inability to afford health care, everybody will agree on a deal that is pretty good for everybody. Consequently, if such a deliberation was on a global scale something globally outstanding would occur and each and every person in the world would obtain a maximum standard of minimum goods, rights and liberties.

We have talked about an international theory of a contractual society. But we had seen that every contractual society it is common to put forward a set of conditions that prepares the ground for justice. So it is crucial to discuss Beitz's circumstances of justice in order to understand his idea of an international society. Beitz prescribes a

very broad and simple principle in which justice becomes relevant, it is when “social activity produces relative or absolute benefits that would not exist if the social activity did not take place” (Beitz 1999, 131). In other words Beitz believes social cooperation is possible and necessary when it produces an amount of benefits that is more than the total of individual production of benefits. In a simple example, we can consider Rousseau’s brief discussion on hunting hare and deer in the jungle in his *Discourse on Inequality* (Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men* 1988, 35-36). Rousseau assumes that there are two individuals hunting in a jungle. Each of them individually is capable of hunting a hare, resulting in a total of two hares however if they work together they can hunt a deer which is in total a bigger harvest. If we consider this situation according to Beitz’s circumstances of justice we would conclude that between these two hunters justice relevant. Because their social activity produces a higher benefit than the total of their individual benefits. Beitz approaches the world politics with this perspective. This implies that he considers the world economy not as a socially disconnected pile of activity but, but as a “cooperative scheme” albeit undeliberate. So Beitz believes there is a global social activity which produces an extra benefit and thence stems the relevance of justice in the relations of the world politics which leads to the societal responsibility of redistribution of the resources throughout the world. At this point in Beitz’s argument the problem is, if we admit the idea that there is global social activity, about the connection between the world economy’s being a cooperative scheme and its implication of social responsibility. In short it is necessary to discuss Beitz’s circumstances of justice. Why would anyone be obligated to help some other person just because they are coincidentally involved in a large economic chain of activities? The answer lies, again, in Rawlsian contract theory.

Rawls considers social contract not as a concrete and historical agreement to forming a society but as a hypothetical one (Mapel 2004, 192). In a hypothetical contract the parties do not have to have agreed to an agreement. They become party to a contract by being actively involved and continuing their involvement in the activities of the social schema in question. Their participation to the agreement indirectly takes place when they participate in the reproduction and sustainment of the conditions created by the contract. It is thanks to the contract, for example, that people are able to engage in commerce without fearing that their competitors might harm them or their goods. So when a person continually engages in these activities they indirectly become a party to the social contract. For Rawls, none of the citizens of any country directly agreed to a contract nor consented to one that has been in effect for the formation of a society. Their implicit approval to their society is apparent in their involvement in and absence of objection regarding the social schema. Rawls calls this kind of agreement a hypothetical one (Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* 1999, 12).

Beitz uses this idea of hypothetical contract in his argument for justice in international society. He claims that world is already in an economic cooperative interconnection (Beitz 1999, 136). By being a party to this interconnection each actor is obliged to fulfill the responsibilities it assigns, namely, endeavoring to establish global justice and standardization of goods, rights and liberties.

Nevertheless Beitz does not do away with fact that states exist and are the most significant element of international politics. Indeed individuals constitute the focal point of Beitz's theory and at the first look states may be a hindrance to the realization of Beitzian global justice, preventing direct contact among persons. However states system cannot be ignored and may be the only milieu through which global justice can be achieved (Mapel 2004, 194). This approach resembles to that of Kant, who despite

regarding individuals as the subjects of world society, does not dispense with states in his theory of world confederacy. As Mapel informs, the aftermath of states system depends on the assumptions about it and its future evolution.

Based on his idea of justice in a society, Rawls, too, puts forward a theory of what we can call an international society, or as he calls it, a law of peoples. This law of peoples emerges in two steps; first it originates from among liberal societies and second it extends over nonliberal but decent societies, whose details Rawls himself gives (Rawls, *Law of Peoples* Autumn 1993, 44). Now I will try to provide an account of this theory as a liberal theory of international society.

The parties to the law of peoples are to be taken as political societies (Rawls, *Law of Peoples* Autumn 1993, 40). Notably, Rawls prefers considering political societies as the unit that should construct and involve itself in the law of peoples, not particular individuals. His reasoning is based on his belief that this law of peoples is capable of including nonliberal societies although it originates in liberal ones. If Rawls started to build his theory on the basis of individuals, he argues, this would result in a narrower definition of the law of peoples since it would include people who have liberal aspirations as individuals (Rawls Autumn 1993, 55). So the first step is that there are liberal sovereign political societies and from their interrelations comes into being a legal system that has binding power over these political societies. This legal system is only meaningful as it is capable of restricting the right to war and the internal autonomy of the member-societies (Rawls Autumn 1993, 42). That is to say, the law of peoples shall regulate the conduct of war (while assuming it only as an act of self-defense) and be capable of interfering domestic politics.

The theory of the emergence of the law of peoples depends on the principle concepts that were laid down in Rawls' magnum opus *A Theory of Justice*, which I

tried to explain above; these are the original position of the members and the veil of ignorance over their self-conception. The original position of political societies present some differences from that of individuals.

The second step is the extension of the law of peoples to nonliberally organized decent political societies, to which Rawls calls well-ordered hierarchical societies. I will not delve into the content of this decency, now –for I wish to explore it in when I compare Rawls’ approach to the English School- so it should suffice to say that it supposes that the nonliberal society, internally respects basic human rights, has political mechanisms elaborate enough for the public views to convey themselves politically based on their sincere belief in the good faith of the justice system, and externally is not principally expansionist and has common interests in its relations with other societies.

It is important to emphasize that in his exposition of the idea of law of peoples, Rawls suggests a constructivist process of creation for such a system. He maintains that the historical process of the diplomatic relations of political societies when they encounter problems and attempt to solve them, will lead to the formation of legal practices and structures (Rawls Autumn 1993, 39). Consequently a body of laws and practices that aims at peaceful resolutions benefiting all its parties will come about. This is, in fact, the process of the first step of the formation of the law of peoples. The interaction of liberal states and its result over time. The second is the extension of this law to nonliberal societies.

3.4. Liberal Conclusion: A Functional and Institutional Conception

Liberals conceive of human beings as rational actors who is capable of bettering themselves through reason and endeavor. Their purpose generally oriented

towards making changes to the existing systems rather than accepting them. In this vein, the liberals believe that the international society can be fully actualized through reasonable thinking and step by step efforts. Their belief relies on their functional and institutional conception of international society. They argue that as long as humans are capable of debating and establishing institutions that fulfill certain functions, change is definitely possible. International conflict is only the by-product of the inexistent institutional channels whose function is to regulate international relations through more peaceful means. Therefore liberals consider the existence of an international society not as a matter of conceptual and theoretical possibility but as a matter of time and work.

CHAPTER 4

THE ENGLISH SCHOOL: INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS AN INSTITUTIONAL-CULTURAL SOCIETY

International Relations theory of English School is the foremost approach with regards to the concept of and issues related to international society. The chapter will begin with the presentation of the views of the classical thinker Grotius with regard to social order, the state of nature, war, natural law and international law. It is well-known that he is an influential figure for the English School. Then in the second part the Hedley Bull's seminal work *The Anarchical Society* will be discussed in terms of its foundational conceptual work in regarding the concepts of order, international system and international society; the discussion on Bull also provides the institutionality of the English School conception of international society. Bull enumerates five concepts as international institutions: balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and great powers (Bull 2002, XXXII). The part on Bull will try to discuss how it is that these concepts count as institutions for the English School conception of international society, paving the way to the claim that the English School concept of international society is idiosyncratically institutional. In the third part the difference between an international society and international system will be discussed through Adam

Watson's investigation into the relationship between the 19th century European society of states and the Ottoman Empire. This historical part will also demonstrate the importance of institutions and diplomatic cultural values behind the English School's conception of international society. Finally a part will discuss the differences between the Realist, Liberal and English School conceptions of international society. In order to proceed with this discussion in an intelligible manner Martin Wight's discussion of three traditions will constitute the backbone.

4.1. Hugo Grotius

As a classical thinker whose ideas influenced the development of the English School, it is important to incorporate Grotius into this part of the study. Grotius' ideas about a Law of Nations, the qualities of it as a kind of law, and its differences from other kinds of law constitute a significant subject-matter for the discussion. Grotius is a thinker who upholds law, justice and just causes for political initiatives. His seminal work *De Jure Belli Ac Pacis* (Concerning the Law of War and Peace) indicates his concern for observing legal requirements even during war. This is because Grotius conceives of the relations among nations one conducted through certain rules and practices. He does not think of this web of relations as an unruly and unbridled chaos.

According to Grotius there are less and more extensive kinds of law than the Civil Law that exists within a society. This Civil Law arranges the rights and responsibilities of free persons. The less extensive one does not stem from the Civil Law, but it is subordinate to it. Less extensive law relates to relations within a household such as that of a father and son or of a master and servant. On the other hand there is the more extensive law that relates to the relations among nations, which is called the Law of Nations. This is the point that is truly significant for this discussion

because Grotius claims that the source of power of the law of nations is the will of all or many nations. Grotius notes that there may be different laws of nations on different parts around the world. But theoretically the foundation of the law of nations rests upon the continual use of these laws and the testimony of expert people in law (Grotius, 163, para XIV).

For Grotius war is something that has be taken into account for the law of nations. The conception of war is telling with regards to the nature of international society (Bull 2019, 73). This is because in a domestic society the private use of force is constrained to fundamental situations and acts of self-defense. Otherwise, individuals are forbidden to use force on their own account. This is one of the foundational qualities of a society, that the use of force is right exercised by the public authorities in order to protect the public interest.

Keeping this in mind, the existence and the conduct of war within the international society would practically jeopardize the very existence of the international society. Therefore the proponents of the idea of the existence of international society have to come to terms with the fact that war exists and is conducted but still there is an international society. Grotius accepts war as part of the international society by arguing that wars should be waged under a just cause. The reasons and intentions behind going to war is essential to his argument. He lays down three legitimate reasons for war: self-defense, reclaiming a stolen property and inflicting a punishment. The foundational reason for all this is to protection of the law and rights of nations (Bull 2019, 75) –it is important to note that speaking of laws or rights are not different for Grotius (Grotius 2005, 147, para IX). So it can be said that the use of force in the international society, that is warring, should serve the same

fundamental purpose of the use of force by public authorities in a domestic society, which is the protection of the society in question.

It is significant to discuss the Grotian view of the state of nature since it is a concept very important to international realism. As it can be remembered from the chapter on realism, Hobbes' view of state of nature entailed that the individuals therein possessed the right to everything and the freedom to do anything in order to protect their lives and belongings, hence the state of war. Grotius is in congruence with Hobbes insofar as state of nature means the absence of civil society. Other than this, it is not Grotius' belief that the state of nature is lawless, chaotic state of affairs. He believes that even in the state of nature human beings are responsible to find and follow the law of nature, because they are endowed with reason. Reason is human beings' inalienable faculty with which they are capable of and encumbered with the law of nature.

A very important of Grotian state of nature is that it is a state of wary defensiveness, rather than the Hobbesian state of war. Hobbes sanctions attacking another person's life and belongings, while Grotius maintains that the person in the state of nature should take care of his own life and sustenance without coveting what others have such as food or shelter. Notably it is not claimed that the person should help others' survival. This is the limit of selfishness of a person in the state of nature: they should keep to themselves but they are not required to help cooperate with others. Cooperation for a common goal is the trademark of a civil society, only therein individuals are required to work together for their common sustenance and happiness (Grotius 2005, XXII (edt. introduction)).

Above all Grotius is known for his contributions to the international law, so it would be only absurd to not discuss it here in relation to our study of the concept of

the international society. Grotius is a proponent of the view of natural law, which maintains that the laws that regulate human society can be found in the nature through reason, as opposed to the view of positive law whose source is the production and the promulgation of laws among human beings through convention. It can be said that Grotius' view of natural law constitutes the first step towards his understanding of international law. By reason every human society is obliged to find and obey the natural law. Their cultural, geographical or historical circumstances; or their private regional agreements among each other is irrelevant to the universal natural law. Here is an example: According to Grotius the law of nature dictates that it is an obligation of a person to repair the damage he inflicted upon another person. The absence of a civil society does not repeal this obligation (Grotius 2005, 896).

However the second step is vitally important in the practice of international law, which is comprised by customs practiced among nations for a while through tacit and private convention.

The force of the international law and its capacity to oblige nations comes from the fact that the obligations is the product of a custom that has been respected by nations for a certain amount of time. Grotius informs us clearly:

As to Customs received by the generality of nations, and concerning which the Law of Nature has given no directions, if we are obliged to submit to them, it is not because they are obligatory in themselves, but as soon as we know a thing is generally practiced, we are, and may be supposed to conform to such a custom, while we give no proof of the contrary. Thus the whole obligation arises from this tacit and private agreement, without which the customs in question have no force. (Grotius 2005, 163).

This twofold form of the law of nations and the significance of the customary side of it are visible in a part where Grotius talks about the rights of prize-taking after

warfare. He says that the victor cannot claim something that does not belong to the defeated even if it is found in its vicinity. In Livy, Grotius exemplifies, it is told that King Bocchus could not take a certain area after his victory, because it turned out that in fact the land in question had not belonged to the enemy. In explaining this principle Grotius says that such an action “is neither agreeable to the Law of Nature, nor was introduced by the Law of Nations” (Grotius 2005, 1357 B3 PXXVI).

4.2. Hedley Bull and the Anarchical Society

Bull starts off with defining the concept of order, which is a key concept for him to elucidate the content of the seemingly oxymoronic expression of ‘anarchical society.’ He defines the concept of order as a particular pattern of arrangement of elements (Bull 2002, 3). The particularity here refers to having a specific purpose in the arrangement. In this respect Bull alludes to Augustine’s description of order as an incomplete but an efficient starting point: “a good disposition of discrepant parts, each in its fittest place”(ibid). In translation of these definitions into the order in the social life Bull explains that it means a pattern of human activity which aims to sustain the basic and universal goals of that social life. The importance of purposive pattern for the concept of order is to specify that not every pattern is orderly. For example a group of aligned books without any specific way to align them does not represent order, because it neither serves practicality nor sustainability in their use. It impairs sustainability because when we pick out a book we will not be able to place it back properly and as a result the arrangement of books will be broken after a while. Also it will be practically very hard to locate a book we want to pick out. On the other hand if the sustainability and practicality of the arrangement is considered as a purpose, there will emerge an orderly arrangement. Moreover they can be arranged in

accordance with various criteria each of which focuses on a certain purpose. For example, consider the chronological arrangement of the books, such a criterion in arrangement implies that what is important in finding the location of the is its time of publication. The search through the shelves will be conducted in regard to the fact that the books are ‘ordered’ chronologically. So, Bull states that the main purpose in societal purposeful arrangement is the preservation of its sustenance and the basic and universal goals that lie at the foundation of the society. In other words, there may be an arrangement of social elements within a certain pattern but this does not constitute a social order. Social order must be an arrangement that entails the purpose of sustainability of the society and the basic sustenance of its members. Without such a purpose, pattern of social arrangement that is embedded with constant inner conflict is possible. There can be surely a pattern in the behaviors and goals of each of the elements but there is no purpose belonging collectively to the social group. Therefore they would not be an orderly group. Bull also emphasizes the effect of rules in the order. To him, rules do not constitute a part within the definition of order, rather, rules should be considered a means to create order (Bull 2002, 7).

Finally Bull turns to the concept of international order. He defines it not unexpectedly: “a pattern of activity which sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or the international society” (Bull 2002, 8). To understand Bull’s concept of international society we must look into the distinctions he made regarding the elements of international relations.

Bull, similar to the realist canon, maintains that states constitute the basis of international relations (Bull 2002, 8). For Bull the concept of state is defined as the independent political community with a governing body which asserts sovereignty over a particular group of people within a particular segment of the earth. The

sovereignty here is twofold, external and internal. Externally, sovereignty means the independence of outside political powers; internally the superiority over any other body or individuals residing within the particular territory (Bull 2002, 8). So, the international relations are conducted by entities who rule their interiority with unrivaled authority and who are independent of any outside political entities, be them counterpart states, corporations or various organizations.

Before introducing the society of states, Bull defines another distinct category for the relations of states called, the system of states (Bull 2002, 9-14). What is intended to be done now is to give the definitions of both concepts of the system of states and the society of states and analyze them in juxtaposition with the purpose of elucidating their difference. While a system of states indicates an interrelation of states which imply that there exists a certain degree of contact and impact among states which causes each of them to act, at least partially, as a part in a whole; a society of states means that there are states which are conscious of their interconnectedness in regard to terms and values in accordance with which they act and conduct relations on the basis of rules and institutions “they conceive themselves to be bound” (Bull 2002, 13). The explanation regarding the difference of the system of states and international society will be made first conceptually than historically.

It is the first order of business to explain what a system of states mean and the implications entailed by it. Bull explains it in the following “where states are in regular contact with one another, and where in addition there is interaction between them sufficient to make the behavior of each a necessary element in the calculations of the other, then we may speak of their forming a system” (Bull 2002, 9-10). In such a system the interaction can be direct or indirect, via cooperation or conflict, or just merely being affected through other states’ action as a third party, which means that

when the relations of two states affect the system, the other existing members of that system are also affected. In order to facilitate the understanding the extent of this interaction, it is recommended to think of it as similar to natural events. For instance, when people use cars with high carbon emission which has the chemical characteristic of holding heat within itself, the carbon emitted to the atmosphere accumulates and floats and as its density increases its capacity to hold heat within the atmosphere also increases, which, in turn, leads to the melting of glaciers due to the increased global temperature; and their melting causes an increase in the sea level. And this goes on to affect the climate in many different ways. Now the question is this: Is this person responsible for the climate crisis by driving a car with high carbon emission which led to the rise of the sea level? Unlikely. But their contribution to the process is undeniable. This is because there is a system in the workings of nature and an impact made upon a part of it, turns into an impact upon the system affecting the other parts within. The actions of a particular group of people may not be increasing the sea level directly, but they take part within the chain of events along the system that ends up rising the sea level. As such, in an international system of states, the actions of a state can affect a seemingly unrelated other states because they co-exist within the same system.

What this indicates is that there is another entity which needs to be taken into account in the international relations. It is because that this other entity somehow exerts an influence big enough to change the course of relations among the states. This entity is the system, that is the system of states itself. Undoubtedly it is not the intention of this study to say or imply that it is a distinct entity carrying a will and devising its own plans. The system is constituted when multiple distinct elements share the same environment to the degree that they cannot ignore each other's actions and plans. By implication, also, such an understanding of the concept of system is in opposition to

the atomistic/ individualistic views with regard to the existence of state. The influence of the system will be more apparent if we consider concepts such as the balance of power in the international relations.

Now we turn to the concept of international society, it is intended that this will also clarify the concept of system of states by way of juxtaposing it with concept of the international society, because therein also exists interactions among states, but its significance is different. The definition provided by Bull is as such: “A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull 2002, 13). It seems arguable that in regards to the characteristics of the international society, the most fundamental difference is the active involvement of states in constituting the phenomenon in question, and this is emphasized by the use of two specific words in the definition of the international society: “conscious” and “conceive.” Therefore I will move to analyze the concept in regard to these terms.

The definition of the system of states implies inadvertence in the way that the system comes into existence. It is not the case where states ‘come together’ and ‘think’ of ‘conceptions’ in regard to their interactions as a system. They are together, because they have ‘somehow’ gathered around each other and therefore they interact whether or not they wish to do so. The system is spontaneously there by virtue of the fact that there are states. It seems beneficial to use an example, again, in terms of natural life. Think of a habitat in which there are several kinds of animal that feed on a certain kind of rabbit. It is logical as much as intuitive that when one of the animals preys on and eats a rabbit, there exists one less rabbit for the other ones. Consequently there is a

competition for food provision among the animals, they do not behave and interact disregarding this competition. Is it plausible to claim that the animal eating the rabbit ‘thinks of’ the logical consequence that, for each of its consumption of rabbit, there remains less for the other ones? Quite unlikely. But it is, again, indubitable that there is interaction and reciprocal affecting between them. Similarly, when states act, be it in terms of politics, economy, military etc. they have an impact upon one another through the system they operate within. And because they know there is an inevitable impact affecting one another they take into account the actions of others. They do not intend or plan to have all these interaction, they have to have them. Hence we come to the word “conscious” used in Bull’s definition of the international society. He claims that its formation entails a conscious and active involvement of the promulgation and the sustainment of certain principles on the basis of common values and interests.

Although the system of states comes about inadvertently, or unconsciously, this does not mean at all that there is no conscious process in its workings. Obviously, states are conscious of each other and of the system they exist in. It is on this account that they take action in wary of each other. I think that the difference lies in the object and manner of consciousness. In an international system, states are conscious of each other, and only through each other they are conscious of the system. So the object of their consciousness is not directly the system but the other states and therefore they are only conscious of an existing system of states in an indirect manner. Their actions do not have an intention of according with the system but merely with calculation of one another as states. When they are conscious of the system, it is thinkable that the system starts looking more like what Bull calls an international society.

So the conceptual kernel of Bull’s concept of international society is that the states in an international society have an direct relation with it. Although the states of

a system are conscious of each other, it is interpreted in this study that the difference in terms of consciousness lies in the fact that the international society is a phenomenon that is being reproduced and sustained by the conscious effort of the states. This is indicated by the terms “common interest,” “common values,” “set of rules,” and “common institutions.” The international society is the result of states endeavoring to constitute a common ground for their interaction. This ground takes their interaction to another level. Consequently the states of an international society take into account the circumstances posited by the international society itself, while, in the case of a system of states, they were only considering each other’s positions. Moreover, maybe the most importantly, the consideration of the international society entails more than circumventing the constraints it imposes upon each state; the states within the society also aim at sustaining and, if deemed necessary, changing the structure of existing international society. They involve themselves within its workings through legal and political institutions.

In short when states exist within a framework where they must merely consider the fact that there are other states influencing each other’s course of activity even if they do not want to, it is called a system of states. However the international society requires effort and care, states directly involve themselves in the workings of it, so that it endures. If states give up on complying with the requirements of the international society, it starts to crumble and eventually becomes extinguished. This sums up the fundamental difference between the system of states and international society as concepts. Bull’s understanding of international institutions or the institutions of the international society accounts for both the difference between the international system and the international society and the institutional aspect of the English School approach. Suganami upholds the view that the English School is institutionalist while

also giving a general definition of the concept of institutions so that it is visible how the English School approach fits into an institutionalist framework: “*By ‘institution’ here is understood a cluster of social rules, conventions, usages, and practices: it is not a mere outwardly observable behaviour-pattern, but a set of conventional assumptions held prevalently among the society-members to provide a framework for identifying what is the done thing and what is not in appropriate circumstances*” (Suganami, *The Structure of Institutionalism: An anatomy of British Mainstream International Relations* 1983, 2365). Based on this definition it is important to note that the concept of institution entails a sense-giving quality, that is, it is through certain institutions that the members of the society can regard things intelligible. Without an institutional structure actions conducted and words uttered remain ambiguous at best. Institutions help clear the significance of them. Thomas offers a very similar definition of institution, emphasizing its sense-giving quality and keeping in mind its connection with culture: “Institutions are cultural rules, principles, and models of reality that give ontological value to actors and actions” (Thomas 2004, 72). Although Thomas’ claim seems more radical than what is meant by a sense-giving function, he does not omit that institutions act to make international relations sensible. This is of value to keep in mind because, as it will be shown, institutions of the English School perspective also functions as sense-giving elements of the international society.

4.2.1. Balance of Power as an institution

Balance of power means, as Bull informs, a state of affairs of powers where none of which is superior to the others in a way to lay down laws (Bull 2002, 96). In other words this is a reciprocal pull and push situation where neither side can effectively take down the other side. Important to keep in mind is that a balance of power can be two sided as well as more.

Bull's account of balance of power entails both material and ideational aspects (Bull 2002, 99). In order there to be a balance of power it needs to be buttressed in both material and belief senses. It does not suffice that, for instance, two nations be equal to each other in their material powers comprising of economic and military resources. Balance only exists when there is a common belief among the members of the international society that the powers of these two nations are equal. The nations must entertain the idea that there is such equality. It is important, indubitably, that such a belief would not be sufficient in creating a sustainable balance of power. There must also be material substantiation behind such belief. So the balance of power needs a background of materiality and belief in order to function as an institution.

According to Bull's exposition there are two sorts of balance of power: a fortuitous and a contrived one (Bull 2002, 100-2). This distinction is of high significance since it also demarcate the concept of balance of power as an institution. Fortuitous balance of power stems from accidents and is a momentary point of equilibrium; on the other hand a contrived balance of power is the comprised result of efforts and policies that are devised and pursued for the sake of common goals of the international society. The characteristic of a contrived balance of power is one of the milieus where the difference of international society from international system materializes, having an active and conscious role in the reproduction of the international order. Consequently a contrived balance of power is the only sort of balance of power that can be regarded as an international institution.

Three functions are listed for the institution of balance of power (Bull 2002, 102): (1) prevention of universal conquest and establishment of worldwide empires; (2) protection of smaller nations from absorption by local larger powers; (3) the most importantly, laying the foundations for the other international institutions: international

law, diplomacy, war and great powers. Although the case of war will be made below it is important to note that Bull considers the preservation of the international society rather than peace, the main purpose of balance of power (Bull 2002, 103). This is why war takes its place as an international institutions and is regulated through balance of power.

4.2.2. International law as an institution

The second institution of the international society is international law. First and foremost the fact that there is an international set of legal regulations to which member-states consider themselves bound strongly indicates the existence of the international society (Bull 2002, 124). It is its primary function that international law provide a supreme set of normative principles regarding the political organization of humans-beings in the world which is called an international society (Bull 2002, 134). This notion is strongly indicative of the difference between the concepts of social order of Hobbesian realism and the English School, because the international law lays down that humans are divided into territorial units whereby resides an unrivaled political sovereignty. This differentiates the English School from the Hobbesian realist account where the international relations is an unruly arena of conflict and from the cosmopolitan, universalist accounts. The English School does not exclude conflict as part of the international society, therefore the co-existence of legal regulations and war is institutionally idiosyncratic.

The ways whereby international law exerts influence over the international society are three: (1) restriction of violence, (2) agreements, (3)sovereignty and independence (Bull 2002, 135). As mentioned, conflict exists but regulated in the international society. International law regulates the ways of conflict and the

concluding treaties, which is part of the body of international agreements. It can be claimed that the function international law serves as a legal framework for sovereignty and independence is of utmost significance for the English School approach on the ground provided in the previous paragraph. International law undermines the idea that international relations is the unruly arena of conflicting actors; on the contrary, international law regulates who the actors are. Consequently this constitutes the quality of international law as an institution in the terms stressed above, institutions as sense-giving elements. Bull clearly suggests that international law is the source of the framework which renders the actions and discourses meaningful in the international society (Bull 2002, 136).

4.2.3. Diplomacy as an institution

Diplomacy is the third institution of the international society and defined as the “conduct of relations in world politics as is carried out by persons authorized to act in the name of party states or other recognized political entity” (Bull 2002, 157). Bull explains that there are five functions to diplomacy as an international institution: (1) Diplomacy is a channel for communication for political entities. (2) Through diplomatic negotiations overlapping interests are determined. (3) Diplomatic channels support the control of information flow among political entities which affects their beliefs regarding one another resulting in shaping the belief in the balance of power. (4) Diplomats tactfully observe traditions, language use and conventions so that they can mitigate frictions. (5) the conduct of diplomacy itself is the symbol of an international society (Bull 2002, 163-6). According to Bull these institutional functions only belong to an institutionalized kind of diplomacy as opposed to an ad hoc one, because he considers two such kinds of diplomatic conduct (Bull 2002, 159). Institutionalized diplomacy rests on a history of relations among nations which

brought forth a set of rules and conventions. Ad hoc diplomacy, on the other hand, is only conducted an emergent issue with its own emergent context and parties without any historical precedence to it, therefore ad hoc diplomacy does not qualify as an institution for the international society. These rules, conventions etc. comprise a diplomatic tradition which is a significantly integral part of the development of international history out of a international system.

4.2.4 War as an institution

War is organized violence taking place between political units (Bull 2002, 178). This is why Bull emphasizes that wars against criminals or pirates do not count as proper war. As an institution of the international society war is restricted to political entities. For Bull war is, as mentioned above, a part of the international institutional order. Although it is itself regulated by norms, rules and conventions wars plays a regulating part as well (Bull 2002, 179). The significance of wars, Bull explains, should be investigated from three points of view: that of state, that of international system and that of international society (Bull 2002, 180-1).

From the perspective of state, war is a policy tool used for achieving goals. This is probably the most common understanding of it. The other two, however, present an aspect of value of the English School approach. From the perspective of the international system, wars have the function of shaping the system by determining who is to endure, who to vanish, how the alliances will be and the borders will be redrawn. Because of these functions, wars provide meaning and context to the concepts of balance of power, hegemony, great powers and sphere of influence, whereby wars carry out their sense-giving institutionality.

From the perspective of the international society, war is assessed through the commonly accepted values, rules and institutions that are thought to bind the states of

the society. In these terms, war is conceived dually. On the one hand war is a disrupting phenomenon for the international social order. It is a potential and vital threat for the structure. Accordingly the society of states concerns itself with the limitation and containment of war through rules and conditions that are determined within the international society. On the other hand the international society regards war as a policy instrument itself in order to pursue its own goals, which are the enforcement of the international law, the preservation of the balance of powers and the possible changes in the international law towards a more just direction.

Bull underpins the restrictive perspective of international society in regards to war because if there is not any restriction to war, it is impossible to speak of international society. Hence Bulls enumerates the ways in which international society restricts war: (1) only sovereign states can go to war, (2) states must conduct war within certain methodical limits, (3) the international society qualifies belligerent and neutral states through legal means in order to regulate the proliferation of war, (4) it lays down proper reasons for going to war (Bull 2002, 182).

4.2.5. Great powers as an institution

Great powers as an institution is necessarily plural. It is a special “club” requiring membership (Bull 2002, 194). The membership to this club comes primarily with superiority of military power (Bull 2002, 195). The influence of the great powers stem from the fact that there is an inequality of powers among nations, that is, some are significantly stronger than others (Bull 2002, 199). Their military preponderance and ways of pursuing international policies enable them to be recognized as having special rights and duties. It is their right or capability to play a determinant role in issues affecting international society as a whole because the weight they have within the international system has their demands more respected than those of weaker states.

So much so that Bull suggests that the overall impact of the great powers on the international society is to simplify the patterns of international political occurrences (Bull, *The Anarchical Society* 2002, 200). Along with their right the great powers also have a duty to fulfill for the international society since their impact can change the way things go in the international society. They are encumbered with managerial responsibilities and policies to pursue conducive to the preservation of the international society. If they behave without such a manner, they are not considered great powers, hence Bull asserts that neither the Napoleonic France nor the Nazi Germany were regarded as great powers despite their military might (Bull 2002, 196).

The great powers function in the international society in two ways: managing their relations to each other and take advantage of the preponderance they enjoy in order to bring favorable directions to the international society (Bull 2002, 200). Although these two functions profess a contradictory aspect, they are important for the dynamism of the international society. The first function, that is, to manage relations among the great powers, serves the purpose of the preservation of the international society. It requires that the great powers observe balance of power, control and avoid crises, and restrict conflicts. On the other hand the second function entails actions more conducive to conflictual situations. Great powers exploit their preponderant situation by exercising superiority over their spheres of influence, respecting each other's spheres and forming great power concerts to take joint actions. Bull emphasizes that these are not always pursued and that states often go astray in their policies; there are rather the depiction of roles they have within the framework of international society. (Bull 2002, 201).

Thus, great powers comprise an international institution that is highly influential in the operation of the international society. They work together with all

other institutions: balance of power, diplomacy, international law and war. All of them function together with the purpose of preserving the international society.

4.3. A Brief Historical Analysis of International Society

One historical discussion regarding the difference between the system and the society of states, can be found in Adam Watson's article "Hedley Bull, States Systems and International Societies" (Watson 1987). Here Watson tries to historically elaborate on the distinction between the system of states and international society by discussing whether or not the Ottoman Empire was included in the European international society. He approaches to the issue through the question of cultural commonality. This is a question derived from the writings of Arnold Heeren's which defines a Staatensystem (system of states) (Heeren 1834, 7-8). Adam suggests that Heeren's conception of system of states is akin to Bull's conception of international society but Heeren argues that at the foundation of Staatensystem also lies a cultural commonality. The participating states share a common culture or civilization. At this injunction of culture, the question arises whether it is appropriate to regard Ottoman Empire as a member of the European international society, given that each was aware of the difference in their cultures. In order to affirm the Ottoman's inclusion Watson searches for two answers: one is that if the situation in question satisfies the conditions set for international society by Bull; and the other is the determination of the extent of cultural commonality maintained by Heeren.

After briefly recounting the history of the interaction between the Ottomans and the Europeans whose significant point for the article was the aftermaths of the Crimean War in 1856, Watson states that the Ottomans were not outside the workings

of European diplomatic institutions and rules. They participated in it to a degree that is impossible to overlook or consider trivially formal. On this basis Watson concludes that the Ottomans were a part of the European society. In regard to Heeren's question of cultural commonality Watson suggests that the commonality is not about the cultural identity of the states. In other words, the members of the international society do not have to share the same cultural elements like religion, custom, language etc. or to be emergent out of the same civilization. What is to be common is an international culture or rather a diplomatic culture in the formation of and the participation to an international society. Also Watson maintains that it is crucial to consider that this diplomatic culture is something that can be exported and appropriated (Watson, Hedley Bull, *States Systems and International Societies* 1987, 151). The sharing does not include the origin. Originally a state can belong to different diplomatic culture and has different understandings, but by appropriating the diplomatic culture of an international society it is possible to engage in their rules and institutions and therefore in the society itself.

In an effort to summarize what has been said about the concept of international society in English School, it must be first established that the concept implies a historical invention, development and reproduction. Dealings among the European states throughout history results in the invention and acceptance of certain practices. These, then, developed and turned into rules and institutions of international affairs. However it was crucial that the participant states in these institutions must have continued to comply with and possibly improve the rules and the requirements of the institutions so that they were reproduced. Without such reproduction the continuation of them is impossible. After all the inventions, developments and the reproduction a culture of international affairs was born among the European states, constituting the

European international society. The last stage is the export of this culture to the states outside the society but within the system of states, an example of such expansion and inclusion is the Ottoman Empire (Watson 1992, 218). Although the Ottomans were not a part of the process of invention and the development of the European society of states until its own participation, they adopted its culture and became a member to it. In the lexicon of the English School, it can be said that the Ottomans' relations with the European states was at a systematic level, for they were part of the same system of states, and then they turned into societal relations within the framework of the European society of states. In the aftermath of the World War 2, the European society of states extended to a global scale (Watson 1992, 258). As a result the English School theoreticians consider international relations in terms of the concept of international society.

4.4. Martin Wight and the Three Traditions

After having explained the concept of international society along with the system of states I would like to discuss its conceptual content with regard to concepts like international law, anarchy and morality. My concern for opening up such a discussions is about establishing a common ground of analysis between the English School and the other two theories of international relations, namely Realism and Liberalism which I investigate together in this study. Remember, I have established that the approach of Realism to the concept of international society is a negative one, that is, Realism does not propose a theory of international society, on the contrary, it offers a theoretical content that refuses to consider the relations among states within a framework of society. On the other hand, while pointing to a more orderly realm of international relations with respect to morality, law and institutions, Liberalism lacks

a power of analysis and sticks too much to theorizing about what ought to be. After establishing a common ground for the juxtaposition of these three theories, I will provide a more detailed account of their differences.

In his seminal work *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, Martin Wight situates the concept of international society on a common ground encompassing three main traditions of international relations approach. These three traditions are, as Wight calls them, Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism (Wight 1992, 7). They can be interpreted to correspond to what is widely used in contemporary as international relations theories, academy Realism, The English School and Liberalism. In the “Theory of International Society” article of the book Wight juxtaposes the three theories with regard to the concept of international society, as the title suggests. I believe looking into this article will be helpful for our initiative.

Wight investigates these tradition within their own contours. In analyzing the realist tradition he starts off with Hobbes’ formulation about the state of nature. As mentioned before Hobbes considers the absence of a superior power, that is, the absence of a sovereign, a natural state of affairs. People who live without a sovereign live in this state of nature which has no laws or rules that apply to them. The state of nature is a state of war, because people are only striving for their own individual well-being and security. Consequently Hobbes equates the state of affairs of international relations with the state of nature, for there is no overruling power among the relations of states. Here Wight expresses this Hobbesian formulation in his own words, he says that for Hobbes international society is a state of nature (Wight, 30). From thereon Wight continues investigating the concept of the state of nature within the contours of Realism, with the purpose of understanding how the international society would be situated with respect to the realist view of the state of nature (Wight, 30-37).

Since the state of nature is a state of war all against all, there is no such thing as an international society in the eyes of Hobbes. Society requires a kind of order. The state of nature is chaotic. Wight informs us that in the realist tradition this position is more or less prevalent encompassing thinkers from Hobbes to Spinoza, Rousseau and Hegel (Wight 1992, 31). Morgenthau is no exception by writing that “Above the national societies there exists no international society so integrated -as to be able to define for them the concrete meaning of justice or equality as national societies do for their individual members” (H. J. Morgenthau 1951, 34). Here we understand that in order for a state of affairs to qualify as a society, it is required that there be such an integration enough to bring the concepts of justice and equality into the concrete framework. There should be an unambiguous definition and enforcement of justice and equality. This actuality is important for the thinkers of realist tradition. Words alone cannot bring about order. Order, justice and equality must have a concrete ground of actualization if we are to talk about a society. Consequently many thinkers in the realist tradition do not see a society of states. Wight calls this view extreme, he criticizes its rigidity (Wight 1992, 36). He names a more conventionalist approach in the realist tradition, the positivist school of international law.

These legal positivists regard that the international society is the totality of the agreements made among states (Wight 1992, 36). These agreements have significance in the international realm because they are the products of the voluntary actions of the states. These thinkers invoke a contractarian theory of society saying that sovereign states are both the subjects of the international society and the sole source of law, for there is no superior will to theirs. However, Wight points out, they are not able to clarify the condition of compliance of states and binding power of laws and institutions. As legal positivists consider states the sole subject of the international society, the

other traditions Wight recounts take a stand of their own in this matter (Wight 1992, 36). There are views that regard humanity as a whole and individuals in particular as the members of the international society, since states and similar institutions are only fictitious representatives. Another branch of thinking considers both the states and individuals valid members of the international society. The latter view here is what Wight calls the Rationalist tradition while the former he calls Revolutionism. Now we turn Wight's discussion of the rationalist tradition.

Wight indicates that the rationalists consider law not a result but a source of society (Wight 1992, 38). Natural law, a pre-existing, something similar to God-given law, existed prior to societies. Therefore the rationalists reject the absolute distinction between the state of nature and a society. The state of nature does not include a social contract but it does not mean that it does not entail any sociality. Wight explains that Grotius regarded state of nature as a preparatory state of affairs. It was not the opposite of the state of society, rather, it constituted the condition for the social contract. State of nature is not social by itself but it is a condition of sociability containing the "germ of society" (Wight 1992, 38). It is a condition of peace but not stable, it is formless and insecure, inclined to turn into warfare. So for rationalists international society as state of nature is not orderless, on the contrary, it is a kind of society but "institutionally deficient" (Wight 1992, 39). There is the absence of a judicial institution which is capable of applying laws commonly to all states. Wight expresses the main difference in these simple terms: "While the Realist will say that force is the dominant mode of intercourse between nations, the Rationalist argues that, on the contrary, custom is" (Wight 1992, 38). That the international law developed throughout history does matter for rationalists while the realists regard such development as nothing but appearances and the revolutionists exaggerate its limits. In the rationalist thought custom is taken

into account as the major factor in the relations among nations in comparison to force. Custom signifies “the absence of an active will to change the frontier” in the inter-state relation in question. Rationalists claim force is used in cases where the custom seems lacking or inconclusive so that the force settles the dispute and remedies the custom, unlike the realist view that custom is simply a façade for the use of force (Wight 1992, 38). The relations conducted among the nations take place within a certain pattern and with a certain purpose –remember our discussion about Hedley’s distinction of international society. Custom refers to this purposeful pattern of interaction that has come into existence throughout history and is still in the process of change and development. Since it is in the process of transformation, custom is liable to fall short of meeting the required effectivity in dealing with an international affair. At this point interferes the use of force as a complementary factor. However the procedure and the aftermath of the use force contribute into the formation of a customary means to deal with this specific problem. Force comes in when custom lacks, but when force is used, it prepares the pre-requisite conditions of the constitution and the promulgation of new principles according to which, from then on, the particular international issue will be handled. So the use of force is a potential door to the international customs. This also explain how the rationalists see the state of nature as containing the seed of society. It is even thinkable in Hobbesian terms, the war of all against all in the state of nature is in fact a preparatory stage of the formation of a societal structure, each act of violence and use of force constitutes another step towards customs coming into existence. Tocqueville makes a similar definition by saying ‘semi-barbarous’: “the society of nations in which each separate people is, as it were, a citizen – a society always semi-barbarous, even in the most civilised epochs, whatever efforts are made to improve and regulate the relations of those who compose it” or Grotius emphasizes this by

saying political and moral quasi-society “*societas quasi politica et moralis*” ((qtd. in (Wight 1992, 38)).

In short the Rationalist tradition emphasizes impact of history, custom and law among nations. It does not deny the weight of the use of force in the international relations but it tries to examine and reaffirm its degree of influence and the contribution to the process of social formation. Now comes the third tradition of international theory, Revolutionism.

We have mentioned above the distinction between the state of nature and state of society. For the realist tradition it was a sharp one, while it gets blurry in the eyes of the rationalist tradition; the Revolutionist tradition eradicates it (Wight 1992, 40). They consider it unimportant. They champion a community of humanity where national borders are meaningless. Another way to put it, it is their ideal to shape international society into a world-society within a super-state. Wight’s diagnosis as a characteristic of Revolutionism is its attempt to transform international politics to domestic politics. He identifies three approaches to this end in the Revolutionist tradition: doctrinal uniformity, doctrinal imperialism, and cosmopolitanism.

The doctrinal uniformity, Wight explains, can be seen in Kant’s project in the *Perpetual Peace* (Wight 1992, 42). Therein Kant claims that the condition of peace relies on that each and every state adopt an identical way of living and practicing politics. They should bear the same ideological tenets, which, for Kant, should be republicanism. So if the principles of governance of each nation around the world constitutes a doctrinal uniformity, a peaceful world society is within the reach. The rationale and content of Kant’s argument is something I intend to deal with it in the discussion about Liberal IR theory and Kant in this study. So Kant believes that unless all the states partake of the same republican ideology there is neither peace nor a world

society. Wight criticizes this way of thinking because it is easily abusable by other ideologies.

The doctrinal imperialism is an approach that is less an argument than an action. It means that a nation spreads its own ideological views around the world so the world gets united under its ideology. This approach also aims at ideological uniformity but suggests a unilateral state endeavor for the prevalence of its doctrines of statecraft. The difference between the doctrinal uniformity and imperialism is first that the doctrines in question are of republicanism; second, that while Kant suggests the voluntary embracement of the republican ideals and the voluntary participation into formation and reproduction of a peaceful international society, the doctrinal imperialism suggests as means the conquest and assimilation of other nations by a particular one with its own doctrines. Wight points out extensive examples from history how the doctrinal imperialism was attempted in various ages by various nations with varying ideologies and he traces this approach back to the Old Testament and the Latin poet Virgil (Wight 1992, 43-44).

The last revolutionist approach Wight examines is cosmopolitanism. This is the most radical idea in terms of its ends. Cosmopolitanism wishes to eradicate national borders and establish a world society composed by individuals as its citizens (Wight 1992, 45). Wight says that this view implies the “total dissolution international relations.” Because by uniting all the individuals in the world within the same society, anything international would be removed. Another characteristic Wight indicates is that the revolutionist tradition deals with ideals, or “aspirations” rather than facts. In a way they embrace the Kantian dictum, which is elaborated in the part dealing with Kant as one of the liberals, about the prominence of what ought to be done as a duty over what is in effect actual. The revolutionists think of and endeavor towards what

they aspire for in the world politics to take place. Their concern is away from the status quo of the international relations.

The focus on aspirations pervades all the revolutionist tradition, whether it be doctrinal uniformity or imperialism, or cosmopolitanism. In this respect the realist tradition focuses on what is, in the international politics and maintains that this state of affairs is unchangeable, transtemporal, something almost natural; on the other hand the rationalist tradition takes international relations into consideration as a process of what has been and what is. It finds history and development significant. Lastly, revolutionist tradition has its eyes fixed on the future and considers what should (ought to) be.

Buzan's identification of Wight's three traditions with three philosophers and three concepts is important: realism, rationalism and evolutionism; Hobbes, Grotius and Kant; the system of states, the international society and the world society (Buzan, 12). It provides us with a common ground to compare the theories of Realism, Liberalism and the English School.

The concept of the system of states, or the international system, can be considered similar to the way the realist and the neo-realist theories conceive of the international affairs. They put the "the structure and process of international anarchy at the center of IR theory" (Buzan, 12). In Waltz's theory of international relations, the foundation of the structure of the international realm was its anarchy. Although he enumerates two more reasons for why wars take place which are that the human nature is predisposed to conflict and that the nature of the state requires the existence of war, Waltz considers the anarchy of international realm the inevitable international condition. As required by such a condition, states find themselves disposed to distrust the other states and focus on their own interests. Here it is important to focus on the

realist concept of interest. By entailing survival and self-sustainability it constitutes the main motivation for states to act. The calculation of self-interest is paramount. However a state's self-interest is not independent of another state's interest. There are often situations where the two conflict. So states must incorporate the existence, interest and the potential behavior of other states. What I am describing here is evidently compatible with Bull's description of the system of states. The realist international arena based on anarchy and the English School concept of international system are parallel to each other. However I think that their difference lies in their historical aspect. For Waltz, the international anarchical system is primordial and everlasting unless a certain set of structural conditions are met and the anarchy prevalent in the international realms dissolves, in other words, it is not subject to gradual transformation over time. On the other hand, the English School regards the international system as a preparatory stage that gradually transforms itself into an international society where customs play the central role in international affairs. Indeed this understanding can be exemplified with Watson's discussion of whether the Ottoman Empire was part of the European society of states or not. Although the traditions and customs regulating the inter-state affairs of the Europe had been developed by the European states via their interaction throughout history, later the Ottoman Empire, as Watson argues, entered into this society of states and contributed to its reproduction by appropriating the European customs of international affairs. It notable here that even though the Ottoman Empire was not a part of the European society of states, it still had relations with it. With much less diplomatic relations, the Ottomans fought wars against European states or sometimes allied with one of them against another European state. I believe it is tenable to argue that the Ottomans had a system-level relationship with the European states previous to its accession into its

society of states, however because of this systemic relationship, the Ottomans were able to establish a connection with and consequently appropriate the European customs of international affairs. This case prominently exemplifies the idea that the systemic level of relations among states can constitute a preparatory stage for their forming an international society. On the other hand the realist outlook does not regard something like an international society to be actual, therefore they do not have the conception of transformation of the international system.

The reason why the realist outlook does not consider the possibility of such a transformation can be found in their view of society. For Waltz a superior power to enforce rules is indispensable for the existence of a society. This is a shared course of thinking among the thinkers who are labeled realists in international relations. Hobbes, too, emphasizes the moment that the covenant among individuals is made, resulting in the creation of the sovereign, the society comes into being. These views can be said to have a binary perspective about the existence of society: a sovereign power either exists or does not exist, accordingly, there is either a society or not. But the English School attempts to make the case that a society can form through time, as a process. For instance, there may not be a central power to enforce the international law, but there are certain rules and principles that regulate and restrain the international conduct. For the English School, it is plausible to claim that such a state of affairs qualifies as a society, because it has, in fact, societal elements operating in its procedures.

Notably, I would suggest that, the procedural approach of the English School to the concept of society, can be found in Niebuhr's and in, at least partially, Rousseau's views. As to why wars take place and why concepts like morality or justice are not relevant in the international relations, Niebuhr asserts that it is simply because the international system is not a society and these concepts are relevant only for

societies. What matters to our discussion at the moment is the reasons behind Niebuhr's assertion about the international system not being a society and his own view on the concept of society.

As the unit of the international relations, nations, according to Niebuhr, are the strongest human collectivities. Although justice is pursued within them by individuals, outside them justice seems irrelevant. Niebuhr's discussion was that in order for a collectivity to keep its integrity and sustain itself justly, it is a pre-requisite that the members of the particular collectivity have the connection with each other close enough to feel sympathy and empower the idea of justice. As elaborated before, members of a nation accomplish this through a set of shared symbols which are fundamentally the conveyed via a common history and language. Now I would like to point out a peculiar and interesting implication in Niebuhr's argument that bears similarity to the thinking of the English School. If symbols, which are crucial for the existence of a society, stem from a common history, it logically follows that historical processes are vitally important in the formation of a society as well. I believe it would not be a far-fetched interpretation to say that Niebuhr's ideas imply that history is at least one of the central factors for a society to come into existence and sustain it. I find this notable because the role of history in social formation is crucial in the English School theory as well. Therefore Niebuhr's logic would admit the possibility of an international society provided that there exists a set of symbols as the product of a common history of the member-states. These symbols would provide a venue of connection and therefore a basis for sympathy and empowerment of justice. However this conclusion leads the discussion to another question: what kind of an international society would this be?

This is an important question because it entails Watson's abovementioned discussion regarding the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire into the European society of states. To this problematic, Heeren's answer was not affirmative, because he considered a society of states a collectivity whose basis is shared cultural values. In opposition, Watson's answer was affirmative because he regarded the basis not as shared cultural values but as a shared diplomatic culture and set of practices. So we have two understandings of an international society that are based on two different set of values. Heeren's arguments was based on a culture that belongs to the people of the nations in question, that is to say, the particular culture to be common belongs to, say, the Germans and the French. If the French culture as the product of the French history and the German culture as the product of the German history have common traits, then the German nation and the French nation can be parts of a supranational society. On the other hand, Watson supposes that the way these nations conduct diplomatic relations and international affairs be common, so that they can be parts of a supranational society. Now the question is that with which one of these views would Niebuhr's argumentation be compatible, if not both?

Niebuhr talks about symbols and sympathy, so it seems plausible to say that the function of the symbols is to enable the feeling of sympathy among the members of the collectivity. A member sees the other bearing a symbol that he himself also bears and arrives at the conclusion that the other is like himself, that both of them are from the same place. This can be interpreted as the fundamental function of the symbol. The symbol indicates a likeness which causes sympathy, and sympathy provides a basis for the formation of a collectivity. If such a symbolic formation is possible in the international realm, then Niebuhr's view of society can include an international one. But can we subject this compatibility to a distinction between the views of Heeren and

Watson? Such a question requires a further reading and deeper understanding of Niebuhr's corpus, at which I will not attempt here. So without any digression from the focus of this study, I suffice to say that Niebuhr's ideas about the concepts of society, nations and symbolism seem open to interpretations that are more English School-oriented, because he directly or indirectly incorporates historical processes and formations into his argumentation.

Next is a comparative discussion between a Rawlsian theory of international society, what he calls a law of peoples, and the English School's approach.

I consider Rawls' idea of the law of peoples very significant. I find in it, a few points discussion that is related to our purpose in this study. Rawls talks about a twostep extension of the law of peoples; the first is its origination among the liberal societies, and the second is its extension to the nonliberal societies. Recall that a relevant point is made in Watson's study where he discusses the question whether or not the Ottomans were a part of the European society of states, to which Heeren's response is in the negative. This is because Heeren considers that only those states who share common cultural traits can be participants to such an interstate society. Watson argues against this on the basis that the commonness can be limited to the conduct of international relations, and to which, I think, Bull's conception of international society provides a ground. Now I believe this English School approach and in particular Watson's counter-argument to Heeren possesses notable similarities to Rawls' argumentation. I will try to demonstrate them.

Watson admits that the emergence of the European society of states initially took place within the European states which share a tight political and religious history. But this commonality is not what constituted the European society of states. Watson argues that it is the diplomatic culture that constituted the international social structure

by being a common element between these states. In other words the European society of states is not characterized by Christianity or some political, economic culture, it is characterized by a certain legal and diplomatic practices laid down and appropriated over time. Consequently, by appropriating them and participating in their reproduction and improvement, it was possible that the Ottoman Empire became part of the European Society. Now, for an efficient juxtaposition, allow me to provide an overview of the two steps of Rawls' law of peoples. Political societies with liberal democratic regimes develop certain practical and legal traditions of international conduct through time, as problems and conflicts arise. When these practices and rules take shape and become coherent, an international society whose laws are capable of regulating the conduct of war as well as interfering with the internal autonomy of political societies. Afterwards another political society that is not ruled with a liberal political regime but possesses certain qualities can also become party to this international society.

I think the parallelism is evident. Both outlooks disregard the necessity of common cultural identity for the establishment of international society. Since it is not difficult to see that they are alike, I would like rather to focus on their differences, by which I would also be able to analyze and assess the reasons why these two comparable perspectives are situated within different schools of thought.

First of all, I think it is important to note that throughout the exposition of his idea, Rawls prefers using the term political society to term state. I do not think it would be presumptuous to say that Rawls' use intimates that he does not want to limit the possible international political actors to merely states. He intends to keep his conceptual arsenal open to debates about the influence of non-state actors in the formation of the international society. This could be posited as a reason for situating

Rawls' theory within the liberal framework, in contrast to the English School, which regards states as the actual figures in the international relations. To note, I will sometimes use the term state, when I talk about Rawls' theory if I am attempting at a comparison between it and the English School.

Another point is about the fact that Rawls himself does not use the term international society in his exposition. He rather uses 'law of peoples.' Rawls explicitly gives an account of why he prefers so (Rawls 2001, 23-30). He considers the law of peoples a product of liberal peoples, which are supposed to have a certain set of qualities which make them capable of giving birth to such an institution. These qualities are (1)having a reasonably just constitutional government, (2)having a common sympathy and (3)showing a moral character. Rawls categorizes these as, respectively, institutional, cultural and moral qualities.

The constitutional government is important insofar as it means a ruling body that is under the "political and electoral control" of the people where it is obligated to answer to the voice of them and direct itself accordingly (Rawls 2001, 24). This should not be government where the officials pursue their own bureaucratic agendas or that of large private business. It should be consciously serving all the citizens.

The second quality, people having a common sympathy, suggests that the people of the government should have a sense of unity as a political body. However this sense should stem from something larger than merely having a common background of history, language and culture, since many countries around the world comprise different groups of people (Rawls 2001, 24). The effect of this common sympathy should be that people have the desire to unite and live under the same governmental institution. Rawls regards this highly important in order for a government to be capable of encompassing different ethnic, religious, cultural groups.

The third and the final one is that the people show a moral character. People who have this moral nature, act in a manner that is restrained by their reason. They believe what they consider reasonable as part of their own lives, should be a part of the cooperation they wish to have with other peoples (Rawls 2001, 25). They should regard it is reasonable to reach a fair terms of agreement and a just conduct. Rawls remarks that it is vital to figure out a way to transfer such a moral nature from one generation to another.

Another significant difference is that Rawls talks about the internal affairs of a state with a considerable length even though he disregards the necessity of cultural commonality between the parties to the law of peoples. He considers it necessary that states with liberal and nonliberal regimes should at least have certain common attitudes in a few matters. Rawls calls the nonliberal society a hierarchical society. For a hierarchical society to be well-ordered, Rawls enumerates three requirements (Rawls, Law of Peoples Autumn 1993, 50).

The first requirement is that the hierarchical society should have gained its internationally legitimacy “through diplomacy, trade and other ways of peace” (Rawls, Law of Peoples Autumn 1993, 50). In addition to this Rawls provides another criterion that is relevant the foreign affairs of the hierarchical society. But it must first be noted that Rawls assumes this hierarchical society is a somewhat religious one, where religion is highly influential in the organization of the society. So the additional trait is that the religion of this hierarchical nonliberal society must not dictate an expansionist policy. This is so that Rawls can ensure in his theoretical exposition that the nonliberal hierarchical society is also a peace-seeking country. Therefore the first requirement can be summed up as follows, the hierarchical society must be peace oriented.

The second requirement concerns the internal affairs of the hierarchical society. This comprises two branches: the legal and the political organization. In regards to the legal organization, Rawls benefits from Soper's theoretical work on law, where he distinguishes a system of law from a bulk of commands (Soper 1984, 125-146). The legal organization has three parts. Rawls thinks that the system of law organizing the society should impose "moral duties and obligations" on all members of the society. This is important in creating a sense of responsibility among the members and to make sure that their reason for complying with the law is something better than the mere fear of punishment. The compliance can be out of responsibility and moral duty if the law is capable of eliciting such an approach. Furthermore, "a common good conception of justice" is necessary for the legal system to be in line with Rawls' requirements. This means that the conception of justice in the society objectively considers the reasonable judgments to the interest of every member of the society. This simply means that the justice does not discriminate or segregate when it passes judgment. Everybody is equal before the eyes of justice. The final part is complementary to the previous one. The officials who implement the law should have the concern that the law they apply is of a common good conception of justice and accordingly they possess the intention of carrying out their official tasks as they are grounded by law. Rawls regards such a legal system essential for the obtainment of internal legitimacy of the regime (Rawls, *Law of Peoples* Autumn 1993, 50).

The second branch is about the political organization of the hierarchical society in regards to its capacity of civil representation in the government. Rawls calls this a consultation hierarchy. In this political organization, individuals are neither as equal to each other nor as free in speech as in a liberal society. But they should have proper channels in the shape of corporate bodies or associations with the capacity for people

to express their governmental disagreement. It is required that different opinions be taken into account, objections must be addressed. This is indubitably in congruence with the legal system described above, where judges and the general conception of justice operate with good faith and to the interest of everybody in the society (Rawls, *Law of Peoples* Autumn 1993, 51).

In short Rawls argues that these requirements ensure the following: peoples access to subsistence, security, liberty, property and a sense of natural justice where case of comparable nature are resolved comparably. So Rawls' concluding remark on the decency of hierarchical societies is that they "respect basic human rights" (Rawls, *Law of Peoples* Autumn 1993, 52).

I have tried to explain the ways Rawls believes the internal affairs of states matter in the formation and operation of the international society. Not only he considers that the first step towards the law of peoples is taken by societies with liberal regimes, but also he supposes that the late entrees of the law of peoples, the nonliberal hierarchical societies should possess a set of qualities regarding decency and respect about basic human rights. Here we come across with the well-known problem of international relations, are the internal and the external relevant? As I have explained, the realist school's answer is in the negative, that is to say, they are not relevant; while the liberal school regards them highly relevant.

4.5. The English School Conclusion: An Institutional, Cultural and Value-based Conception

It is often said that the English School occupies a theoretical middle-way between Realism and Liberalism. Similar to the realist thinking the English School affirms the primacy of states, self-interest and the anarchical structure of the

international relations. But also it is similarities to the liberal thinking in that they conceive of a change in international relations throughout history, and that they consider institutions effective. The characteristic quality of the English School, however, reveals itself with its reliance on the historical development of customs in regulating the international relations. From Grotius' ideas to Watson's discussion, historical process and customs seems to have significance in the way the English School conceives of an international society. It regards diplomatic institutions as tools supplanting the conduct of war in resolving international disputes. Then English School deems a certain cultural commonality effective in the formation and operation of international society but, notably, the said culture is more of a culture of diplomatic conduct rather than a culture of religion, nationality, political regime and language. This shows itself in the case of Ottoman Empire. So it seems that the English School conception of international society is built around institutions and values of a diplomatic culture which developed throughout history between nations who fought against each other and learnt to devise ways of conduct that is not conflict-oriented. It is noteworthy that the concept of war is regarded as a germ of societal relations, through which it is possible to attain peaceful relations.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In the first part of our study, the realist perspective on the concept of international society has been discussed. The discussion initially focused on the analysis of a certain group of fundamental concepts such as morality, international law and war. This is because of the lack of Realism regarding a direct debate about the concept of international society on the grounds that the very foundational realist assumptions disregard the possibility of such a conception. So an analysis of these concepts has been made and by way of inference, the realist position with respect to the concept of international society is attempted to be demonstrated. This was also done in accordance with what E.H. Carr called the negative approach of the realist theory, that is to say, the realist theory regards itself tasked with showing what is *not* possible, *not* right, *not* relevant etc. to the international relations, rather than describing what is or what should be. The realist discussion has taken us to matters such as human nature, psychology and pedagogy in regard to the possibility that whether these can be instrumental in solving the problem of war and establishing peace, or that whether the human nature is unchangeable.

The discussion on Hobbes' realism revealed that, aside from problems stemming from human nature, Hobbesian theory of contract is incompatible for states to make an international covenant leading to the formation of an international society. A close inspection of Hobbesian contract demonstrated that the state as the sovereign over its subjects does not have the right to renounce its rights and freedoms to a higher power, unlike individuals who can renounce their rights and freedoms to make a covenant.

An exit in the discussion on occurrences of war was, as Waltz argued, that pedagogical and psychological approaches are insufficient to solve the problems of international politics, because there are factors that have a larger scope, such as the structure of states and the structure of the international system.

So the discussion of Realism continued with the internal effects of states and the effects of international system in the unfeasibility of the existence of international society. It was claimed that domestic societies have structures that constitute obstructions to the formation of international society, let alone being unsuitable. States are predisposed to conflict and therefore incompatible with a condition of international society. Although admitting that there is truth in this argument Waltz argues that the structure of states do not constitute the fundamental reason behind international conflict. Finally he argues that the existence of the international anarchy makes it impossible to regard concepts like law, morality and international society relevant to international politics as the fundamental reason behind the insoluble problem of international conflict. To Waltz seems that the only way to abolish this anarchy is the notorious task of the establishment of a world government. Consequently, human nature and international anarchy condemn the realist conception of international society a null-conception.

In the second part the theory of Liberalism was discussed. The stark differences between the liberal and the realist theory which are, so to say, engraved in their assumptions, were demonstrated. The essence of this difference is that the liberal thinking wished to lay down what *ought to* be the case in contrast to the realist one which posits what actually is and how we should deal with it. After a general account of the liberal theory, a more extensive discussion of Kant's approach to the international relations was provided. It was demonstrated that the liberal principle of thinking was Kant's moral philosophy of tasking the human-being with figuring out and endeavoring towards what is rationally the ideal state of affairs. The discussion tried to give an account of how Kant envisioned a world federacy where states pursue peaceful relations and restrict and regulate the conduct of war as a right to self-defense. Exploring Kant's theory also covers his perspective on the issue of internal/external distinction in international politics, which produces the question whether internal affairs of states influence the international politics. While the realist school responds to this mostly negative, with a few deviations, the liberal school has a positive response. Kant is no exception. Afterwards I attempted to explore the approaches of two prominent contractarian thinkers, John Rawls and Charles Beitz, who devise their own theories regarding the establishment of an international structure where law and order matter and the internal autonomy of states are varyingly influenced. Therefore it has been demonstrated that the liberal conception of international society is one of functional and institutional nature.

The third part dealt with the English School theory and its conception of the international society. It started off with a brief demonstration of Grotius' ideas and how they provided a foundational guidance to the English School thinkers. His particular understanding of the state of nature where moral obligations still exist as the

result of human reason is shown to be exemplary of how the English School theorizes an international social order along with anarchy.

Bull's approach of an anarchical society was tried to be explained, international system and society were conceptually distinguished. Their differences and the historical transformation from one to another was tried to be demonstrated. Bull's exposition on the institutions of the international society was described and the way they act as institutions were tried to be explained. These are balance of power, diplomacy, international law, war and great powers and their purpose is to conserve and sustain the international society itself, even though it may lead to some violent conflicts among nations. This showed the institutionality of the English School in its idiosyncrasy.

The transformation of international system into international society as Bull explained was exemplified through Watson's case analysis about the European society of states and the Ottoman Empire, which also heavily contributed to theoretical discussion. Here it was argued that the element of culture in the English School conception of international society does require that the member states should have a cultural affinity with the states of the society they are entering into. According to Watson, what proves crucial in terms of culture is the diplomatic culture which can be obtained and practiced as time goes and relations among nations develop. Consequently Watson's point was that the Ottoman Empire was part of the European society of states due to a learnt and shared diplomatic culture.

Wight's work of *The Three Traditions* was not only discussed but also beneficial in providing an account of the position of the English School theory with respect to other two theories, namely, Realism and Liberalism. So the differences and common traits between these theories were also put forward. Finally a closer

investigation regarding the similar and distinct aspects of the English School in comparison to the other two was conducted. It was realized that the centrality of state and state interest in the realist school was also included in the English School, however the English School, as it was tried to be shown, interprets the act of war, and the concept of order in a starkly more different way than the realist theory, where order can be sustained along with anarchy and wars do not necessarily mean chaos and can be instrumental in developing international social relations. As a characteristic of the English School, it was also seen that diplomacy is a central concept. So it was concluded that the English School conception of international society is deeply rooted in a diplomatic culture that gave way to the creation and embracement of certain institutions and values as a basis throughout history.

In the final analysis it was intended to show that the realist perspective on the concept of international society ends up as a null-conception, that is, a conception that signifies only negatively. For both Hobbesian and Waltzian thinking it is conceptually nullified that states can form an international social order. For Hobbesian contractual theory it is technically nullified. For Waltz, the international anarchy is the primary reason as to why an international society is impossible, he argues that order is the result of force not voluntary renunciation. So for realism, the international society remains a null-concept.

The difference of liberal perspective from the realist one reveals itself in its first move, that is, focusing on what should be not what already is. Following this Kantian maxim liberals try to build a theoretical framework where an international social order can be achieved. So the first part of the discussion on liberal perspective focuses on Kant's moral and political philosophy, since they are inseparable, with emphasis on his idea of a supranational cosmopolitan federation. It was seen that

Kant's idea is highly institutional where he believes states can come together and found a federation where international law would be prevalent. For Kant a worldwide state is unnecessary and the voluntary participation of states in the worldwide institutions are sufficient. Free commercial activities play a foundational role not only Kant but also Beitz who grounds his argument that international justice is relevant on the claim that there is a global economic social activity which would cease to exist without such a concept of justice. This brought us to the conception of international society with an outlook of functionality. Justice and society are relevant by virtue of their functional output.

As the last part of liberal discussion Rawls' case of law of nations is made. Rawls, contrary to the way of realist thinking, establishes a solid connection between the internal structure of states and the possibility and membership of an international society. Such a society would only open to liberal states and states with decent regimes of which Rawls gives a detailed account. Here it was argued that Rawls' theory exemplify an institutionalist approach to the concept of international society, particularly, these institutions take certain ideological and political shapes throughout the internal and external affairs of states. It is also notable that Rawlsian law of nations resembles the English School conception of international society in its understanding of historical development. The radical differences between the both is that the membership to the international society requires a certain internal political structure for Rawls while it does not for Bull's and Watson's discussions.

The last part of the study deals with the English School conception of international society through the lenses of Grotius, Bull, Watson and Wight. Grotius is essentially influential in English School thinking. Like Hobbes he also provides an account of the state of nature, but the picture is quite different. Distinguishably Grotius

does not believe that the state of nature is a state of war or a set of circumstances where morality is null. His strong conviction in human reason compels him to consider morality still valid in the state of nature. This way of thinking is effective in Bull's idea of an anarchical society.

Bull's description and definition of international society indicates its difference and transformation from international system. That the common consciousness of states that they are participating in the sustainment of an international society is what sets it apart from international system. Bull expounds on the institutions that play foundational roles in the existence of international society. It is important to keep in mind that these institutions not only materially help the international society to exist but also function in a sense-giving way.

Balance of power is the most essential one lying the foundations of other institutions to operate. It is important that the states of the society consciously endeavor to preserve the balance of power if it is to be an institution, that is, accidental situations where there is a balance among powers do not count as an institution.

Second comes international law as it offers a framework that renders the actors and actions states meaningful. It provides the legal view that humans of the world are divided into regions where they are sovereign. With this notion alone, Bull, marks the difference of English School in its reception of international sphere, which is unlike the unruly Hobbesian state of nature or a highly institutionalized and functional cosmopolitan organization. Bull asserts that even the fact that states conceive themselves bound to a set of rules called international law is a solid indication of the existence of international society.

Diplomacy, thirdly, is considered to be the symbol of international society. In Bull's and Watson's discussions it is visible that diplomacy exemplifies the

institutional and cultural aspect of international society. Its institutionality is apparent in the fact that Bull regards it as an institution only if it is practiced in a historically established fashion, distinct from ad hoc ones.

Forth institution of the discussion is war. This also shows the idiosyncrasy of the English School in its approach to social order, because it actually conceives of war as part of the international social order. Order and conflict are not essentially antithetical for Bull. It is indubitably important to keep in mind that Bull does not encourage war as an institution. His conception of it offers two aspects for the international society: war as something to be restricted and war as a tool of change in the structure of international society. War also serves a sense-giving function for it is the institution that provides materiality to other institutions such as balance of power and great powers.

Last institution of Bull's account is great powers. They simplify the pattern of behaviors in the international order. Great powers must be recognized to have special rights and duties, if they are to operate as an institution. Their right stems from that their demands are more respected while their duty is to pursue policies ensuring the preservation of the international society. However they also avail themselves of their regional superiority in order to change the direction of the international society.

It is the conclusion of this study that in the English School perspective there is a concept of international society that is institutional and cultural as opposed to the realist null-conception and different from the institutional and functional conception of liberalism.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY/ TÜRKÇE ÖZET

1.GİRİŞ

Bu çalışmanın amacı geleneksel uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinde uluslararası toplum kavramını incelemektir. Geleneksel teoriler olarak Wight'ın *Three Traditions*'da belirttiği realist, rasyonalist ve devrimci tasnifi müteakiben sırasıyla Realizm, İngiliz Ekolü ve Liberalizm teorileri ele alınmıştır. Bu teorilerin incelenmesindeyse her biri için belli başlı önde gelen düşünürler odak noktası olarak seçilmiştir. Realizm için Thomas Hobbes ve Kenneth Waltz; Liberalizm için Immanuel Kant, John Rawls ve Charles Beitz; İngiliz Ekolü içinse Hugo Grotius, Hedley Bull, Adam Watson ve Martin Wight'a odaklanılmıştır. Uluslararası toplum kavramının farklı yaklaşımlarla farklı bir mahiyette ele alınmasından dolayı belli bir karşılaştırma zemini ve kavramsal ortaklık sağlamak adına genel bir toplum tanımı kullanılmıştır: üyelerinin ortak faydasını teminat altına alan işbirliği odaklı teşekkül. Uluslararası toplum ise siyasi olmasa da belli başlı psikolojik, ahlaki ve hatta belki de hukuki mükellefiyetler yükleyen bir ahlak ve kültür bütünlüğü oluşturan egemen devletler topluluğu olarak düşünülmüştür.

Çalışmanın birinci bölümü Realizm'i konu edinir. Uluslararası toplum gibi bir kavramı irdelemek için realist bakış açısını, E.H. Carr'dan alıntılarla, bir negatif teori olarak kullanmaktadır. Uluslararası toplumun nasıl bir teşekkül olduğunu izahtan ziyade onun neden imkansız, düşünülmesinin manasız ve nihayetinde bir boş-kavram

olmaya mahkum olduđu gösterilecektir. Zira Realizmin bir teori olarak temelini oluřturan varsayımlar bizatihi uluslararası toplum gibi bir kavramı geliřtirmeye müsait deđildir. Bundan ötürü bu kavramın imkansızlıđından bahsetmek elde kalan en etkili yol olarak görölmektedir.

Realizm Hobbes ve Waltz'ın pencerelerinden incelenecektir. Hobbes literatürde klasik realist düşünceinin önde gelen isimlerinden, Waltz ise modern isimlerinden birisi olması hasebiyle seçilmiştir. Bu düşünürlerin eserlerinde, dendiđi üzere, doğrudan uluslararası topluma atıf pek bulunmadıđı için uluslararası ilişkilerde ahlak, hukuk, savař gibi kavramlar üzerinden yürütölen tartışmalar irdelenecek ve bu tartışmaların içerimleri üzerinden uluslararası toplum kavramının realist çerçevedeki konumu açıklanacaktır. Neticede Realizm perspektifinden bakılarak görölecek bir uluslararası toplum kavramının ancak bir boş-kavram olduđu ortaya konmaya çalışılmış olacaktır.

Çalışmanın ikinci bölümü Liberalizm'i konu edinir. Kant, Rawls ve Beitz'a odaklanılır. Kant'ın ahlaki ve siyasi düşünüşte olandan olması gerekenin çıkarsanması yönündeki görüşü reddetmesiyle nasıl Realizm ile temelli bir metodolojik bir farka sahip olduđu ve aynı şekilde devrimciliđinin kaynađı gösterilmektedir. Kant'ın *Ebedi Barıř*'ı ve ahlak felsefesi konusundaki çalışmaları merkezilik teşkil eder. Ardından Rawls ve Beitz'ın sözleşmeci bir uluslararası toplum inřasına yönelik iddiaları deđerlendirilir. Netice itibariyle Liberalizm'de uluslararası toplum kavramının belli işlevlere ve kurumlara dayanan bir kavram olarak ele alındıđı ortaya konmaya çalışılmış olacaktır.

Üçüncü bölümde ise İngiliz Ekolü teorisi, odakta Grotius, Bull, Watson ve Wight olmak üzere irdelenecektir. Grotius'un rasyonalist geleneđin önde gelen düşünürü olarak İngiliz Ekolü'nü uluslararası toplum kavramı nezdinde ne açıdan

etkilediği açıklanacaktır. Ardından Bull'un *Anarchical Society* isimli eseri uluslararası toplum kavramını inşa ediş ve sunuşu nispetinde incelenecektir. Bull'un uluslararası toplumun kurumları olarak gördükleri unsurlar sunulacaktır. Sonra Bull'un kavramsal tartışmasını örneklendirmek amacıyla Watson'ın yürüttüğü tarihsel bir vaka tartışması aktarılacaktır. Nihayetinde ise Wight'ın *Three Traditions* isimli çalışması çerçevesinde Realizm, Liberalizm ve İngiliz Ekolü yeniden ele alınıp birtakım benzerlik ve farklılıklar tasvir edilecektir.

2.BÖLÜM REALİZM

Hobbes'un bakış açısının temelini insanın doğal bencilliği ve buna eşlik etmekte olan anarşinin oluşturduğu ortam teşkil etmektedir. Bu ortam Hobbes'un toplumun bir sözleşme ile ibdasından önce hakim olduğunu tabiat hali iddia ettiği şeydir. Bir sözleşme ile toplum kurul ve egemen ortaya çıkar, böylece bireyler arasındaki tabii düşmanlık, Hobbes'un tabiriyle, savaş hali sona erer. Uluslararası ilişkilerde böyle bir egemen mevcut olmadığı için oradaki hal de tabiat halidir. Bu durumda realistler devletlerin kendilerini kurtarmaktan başka bir çareleri olmadığı kanaatinde dirler. Bu şartlar altında devletlerin davranış motivasyonu ahlaki kaygı veya kaideler değil hayatta kalmak ihtiyacıdır. Bu yüzden her devletin kendi güvenliğini teminat için her şeyi yapmak hakkı ve özgürlüğü vardır.

Toplum öncesi tabiat hali bir savaş hali olduğundan güvenlik hissi söz konusu değildir, Hobbes tabiat yasası adı altında birtakım ilkelerin bulunduğunu söyler. Bunlardan birincisi hayatta kalmak ikincisi ise insanın karşısındakine davranılmak istediği gibi davranmasıdır. Bu ikinci ilkeye binaen Hobbes, bireyin tabiattaki kaotik yaşayışı esnasında kendisiyle sözleşme yapmaya açık bir ötekine rastlaması durumunda toplumsal sözleşmenin yapılması gerektiğini iddia etmektedir. Bu noktada

bireyler tabiat halindedir ve hayatta kalmak için her şeyi yapmak hak ve özgürlüğüne sahiptir. Bir toplum sözleşmesi yapmak ise bu hak ve özgürlüklerden güvenlik tesis edecek bir egemenin ibdası için feragat etmek demektir. Bireyler feragat ederler ve kendilerini korumak görevini verdikleri egemenin koruması altına girerler.

Buradan hareketle Hobbesçu bir perspektifte uluslararası toplum tabiat halinde yaşamakta olan devletlerin her şeyi yapmak hak ve özgürlüklerinden feragat etmeleri manasına gelir. Bu ise Hobbes için teknik olarak imkansızdır. Çünkü Hobbes toplum sözleşmesinin tarafları arasında egemenin bulunmadığını, sadece, sözleşmeden sonra tebaa denecek olan bireylerin bulunduğunu söyler. Egemen ancak bireyler sözleşme yaptıktan sonra ortaya çıkar, dolayısıyla sözleşmeye bir taraf değildirler. Feragatlerin ve sözleşmenin geçerliliği tamamen bireylerin katılımıyla ilgilidir. Bundan dolayı egemen bir tarafı olmadığı bu sözleşmeyi devredemez, hakimi olduğu toplumun hakimiyetinden cayamaz, ve netice itibarıyla de toplumun güvenlik teminatını da başka bir yapıya aktaramaz. Hülasa Hobbes'a göre devletler egemenliklerinden feragat ederek bir uluslararası toplumun parçası olamazlar. Burada görülmektedir ki Hobbes'a göre uluslararası toplum bir boş-kavramdır.

Kenneth Waltz'ın *Man, the State and War* isimli çalışması savaş ve sosyal düzen arasındaki tezat bağlamında incelendiğinde bu çalışmaya oldukça yardımcı olacağından merkezî addedilmiştir. Waltz eserinde savaşın sebeplerini üç farklı veçheden incelemekte ve bunlardan hangisinin daha asli olduğunu belirlemeye çalışmaktadır. Her bir veçheye imaj demektedir ve bu imajlar sırasıyla insan, devlet ve uluslararası sistemdir.

Birinci imajda Waltz savaşın sebebi olarak insan doğasındaki ya da zihnindeki birtakım özelliklerin öne sürüldüğü iddiaları inceler. Savaşlar olur çünkü, insan kötüdür, bencildir veya eğitimsizdir. Bu iddiaları adım adım çürütmeye çalışır. İkinci

imajda savařın sebebi olarak devlet teřekklnn yapısının temel teřkil ettiđini ne sren iddiaları tartıřır. Bu grřlere gre devletler i siyasi birliđi tesis iin dıřarda bir dřman belirlemek ve savařa kendisini srklemek zorundadır. Waltz bu iddialara belli bařlı cevaplar verdikten sonra nc imaja, yani uluslararası sisteme gelir. Burada kendi iddiasını, ađırlıklı olarak Rousseau'nun dřncelerine yaslanarak ileri srer. Waltz'a gre savařın mevcudiyetinin temel sebebi uluslararası anarřidir. stte anılan sebepler tesirsiz deđillerdir ama belli bařlı durumlardaki mevcut sebeplerdir; uluslararası anarřiyse diđer sebeplerin savařa yol amasına zemin hazırlayan temel sebeptir. Dolayısıyla savařın sona ermesi iin anarřinin ortadan kalkması gerekmektedir. Uluslararası anarřinin zevalinin tek yolu ise devletler st bir devletin, yahut bir siyasi teřekkln kurulması ve ye devletlerin egemenliklerinin sona ermesi gerekmektedir. Sonu olarak denebilir ki Waltz iin de uluslararası toplum bir boř-kavram olmaktan teye gidememektedir.

3.BLM LİBERALİZM

Liberaller realistlere nispeten farklı bir dřnř sergilemektedir. Realistler mevcut durumun ne olduđunu tespit edip uygunca davranmanın yolunun ararlarken liberaller mevcut durumla ilgilenmekten ziyade ideal durumun nasıl olması gerektiđi ve nasıl tesis edileceđini tartıřırlar. Bu bakıř aısı Kant'ın ilkesini yansıtır niteliktedir, vaziyetin ne olduđundan ne olması gerektiđi ıkarsanamaz.

Kant'ın ahlak felsefesi onun uluslararası iliřkilere bakıř aısını derinden etkilemektedir. Ona gre insan aklı yoluyla keřfedeceđi birtakım temel ilkeleri, yani kategorik buyrukları takip ederek yařamalıdır. Ahlaki davranıřın motivasyonu olarak faydayı veya neticeyi grmek hatalıdır. Deontoloji ya da dev ahlakı denen bu

düşünüşe göre kategorik buyruk bizatihi iyi olduğu akılca teyit edildiği için takip edilmelidir.

Kant'a göre devletlerin ve devlet görevlilerinin uymaları gereken kategorik buyruklardan biri ebedi barışı tesis etmektir. Bu barışı tesis etmek maksadıyla devletler uluslararası anlaşmalar ve hukuk aracılığıyla devletlerin gönüllülük esasıyla katıldıkları bir federasyon kurmalıdır. Devletlerin gönüllülüğü önemlidir zira Kant'a göre devletin ahlaki bir mükellef olarak münferitliğinin korunması gerekmektedir. Böylece Kantçı bir uluslararası toplum kurulmuş olur. Kant'a göre bu toplumda savaşın tek meşru yeri, devletlerin nefsinin müdafası veya ebedi barışa giden yolu kapatacak bir ilke benimsemiş bir devletin izâlesi olabilir.

Kant ebedi barışa giden yolda en önemli kurumlardan birinin ticaret olduğu kanaatindedir. Savaş daima masraflı ve zayıflatıcı bir şeyken ticaret kazançlıdır, dolayısıyla birbirlerinin zıttı gibidirler. Ticaretin bu fonksiyonu onu uluslararası bir topluma giden yolda temel kurumlardan biri yapar. Bu bakımdan Kant'ın işlevsel ve kurumsal bir uluslararası toplum inşası öngördüğünü söyleyebiliriz.

Rawls *Law of Nations* isimli eserinde ulusların hukuku adı altında bir uluslararası toplum tasavvuru ileri sürer. Ona göre liberal-demokrat rejimlerle yönetilen devletler bir noktada böyle bir uluslararası yapı oluşturabilirler. Bu süreç sözkonusu devletlerin arasındaki tarihsel ilişkilere, kültüre ve diplomasiye dayanarak gelişir. Liberal-demokrat devletlerin kurdukları uluslararası topluma bu rejimle yönetilmeyen devletler de sonradan katılabilirler fakat mevcut rejimlerinin insan hakları uluslararası dostane niyetler çerçevesinde belli başlı bir düzgünlük içermesi gerekmektedir. Burada görülmektedir ki Rawls'a göre belli başlı işlevleri gören kurumların varlığı üzerine bir uluslararası bir toplum inşa edilebilir.

Beitz kendi uluslararası toplum tasavvurunu geliştirirken Rawls'un toplum sözleşmesi teorisini kullanır. Evvela adaletin uluslararası bir topluluk için neden önemli olabileceğini ortaya koymaya kalkışır. Beitz'a göre zevaliyle beraber ortadan kalkacak herhangi bir faydanın müsebbibi olan işbirlikleri sürdürülmekle yükümlüdür; öte yandan uluslararası ekonomik sistem de tıpkı böyle bir fayda intaç emektedir. Bu ilke ve olgudan hareketle Beitz adalet düşüncesinin uluslararası ilişkiler için geçerlik arz ettiğini söyler. Elbette uluslararası kolektif faaliyetin verimini sürdürmek ve belki arttırmak amacını güderek inşa olunacak bu uluslararası toplumun kavramsal temelleri Kant'inkinden farklı olarak sonuç odaklı ve faydacı bir yol izlemektedir. Fakat şunu söyleyebiliriz ki belli işleve ve kurumların çalışmasına dayanmak dolayısıyla Beitz'da da işlevsel ve kurumsal bir uluslararası toplum kavramı görülmektedir.

4.BÖLÜM İNGİLİZ EKOLÜ

Üçüncü bölümde Grotius, Bull, Watson ve Wight üzerinden İngiliz Ekolü'ndeki uluslararası toplum kavramı incelenmektedir. Grotius'a göre devletler arasında bir uluslar hukuku bulunmaktadır. Bu hukuk devletler arasında tarihsel ilişkileri boyunca oluşan teamüllere dayanmaktadır. Bu teamüllere Gortius o kadar önem verir ki mevcudiyetleri bile hukuki mecburiyetin temelini oluşturmaktadır. Savaş bu teamüllerle beraber uluslar hukukunun içerisinde sayılır.

Grotius tabiat halinin sivil hükümetin olmaması manasına geldiği hususunda Hobbes ile hemfikirdir fakat aralarındaki fikrî uzlaşma bu noktaya kadardır. Zira Grotius'a göre insan tabiat halinde de ahlaki sorumluluğa sahiptir, çünkü insanın akıl sahibi bir canlı olması hangi durumda yaşadığı ile değişmez. Bu akıl insanı ahlaken sorumlu kılar.

Grotius ahlaki sorumluluğu ve tabiat halini, uluslararası hukuku ve savaşı beraber alımlaması dolayısıyla rasyonalist çizginin realist ve liberal orta yolundaki yerini göstermektedir. Bull'un ilk intibada oksimoron gibi görünen kitabı *Anarchical Society* de aynı göstergeye sahiptir, anarşik toplum.

Bull önce düzen kavramını unsurların belli bir örüntü üzere istiflenmesi olarak tanımlar. Bu örüntü, sözkonusu istiflenmenin belli bir amaca riayeten yapıldığı manasına gelmektedir. Toplumsal düzen de, buradan hareketle, sosyal hayatın evrensel amaçlarını erişilebilir kılmaktır. Nihayetinde ise uluslararası bir sosyal düzense devletler toplumunu, yani uluslararası toplumun birincil ve ikincil hedeflerini temin eden bir faaliyetler örüntüsü olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Uluslararası toplumun esas aktörleri devletlerdir.

Uluslararası toplumun izahatına geçmeden önce Bull uluslararası sistemi sunar ve ona kıyasla uluslararası toplumu tarif eder. Uluslararası sistem devletlerin birbirlerinin varlıklarını ve davranışlarını göz ardı edemeyecek şekilde bağlantılı oldukları ve birbirlerini hesaba katmadan politik gündem belirleyemeyecekleri bir teşekküldür. Buna kıyasla uluslararası toplum devletlerin birbirlerine belli başlı kurallar ve değerlerle bağlı oldukları bilinç ve anlayışıyla ve belli kurumlar vasıtasıyla ilişkilerini sürdürdükleri bir teşekküldür. Burada uluslararası toplumun temel farkı devletlerin bu ortak teşekküle dair belli bir bilince sahip olmaları ve bu teşekkülün sürdürülmesi için faal bir katılımında bulunmalarıdır. Uluslararası sistem ise devletler arasındaki ilişkinin tesadüfi konumlanışından ve politika geliştirirken birbirlerini birer değişkenden ibaret biçimde hesaba katılacak unsur olarak görmelerinden başka bir şey değildir. Ortak teşekkülü sürdürmek gayesinin güdüldüğü gözlenmez.

Devamında Bull'un uluslararası toplumun kurumları olarak ele aldığı unsurlar tartışılır: güçler dengesi, uluslararası hukuk, diplomasi, savaş ve büyük güçler. Bull'a

göre bunlar uluslararası toplumun kurumlarıdır ve nihai amaçları uluslararası toplumun devamını sağlamaktır. Bu kurumlar aynı zamanda uluslararası ilişkilerde eylem ve söylemlerin mana kazandıran çerçeveyi de sunmaktadır. Burada yine İngiliz Ekolü'nün kendine münhasır düşüncesini görmek mümkündür, savaşı toplumu idame ettiren bir unsur olarak ele almaktadır.

Savaş o denli bir mahiyettedir ki güçler dengesi ve büyük güçler kurumların anlam çerçevelerini oluşturur. Zira bu kurumların işleyişi büyük oranda ülkeler arası askeri bir kıyastan ve boy ölçüşmeden ileri gelmektedir. Öte yandan güçler dengesi hem uluslararası toplumun hem de onun diğer kurumlarının işleyişinin temelini teşkil eder. Güçler dengesi olmaksızın ne uluslararası hukuk ne diplomasi icraata dönüşebileceği gibi savaş kurumu belli bir amacı ve durumu mahsuben işlev göremeyecektir. Büyük güçler de, şayet güçler dengesi gibi bir kurum olmazsa kendilerine biçilmiş olan hak ve sorumlulukları algılayamayacaktır. Nitekim büyük güçlerin, en başta askeri açıdan, büyük olmaları hasebiyle uluslararası toplumda talepleri diğer devletlerden daha tesirlidir. Bu da onlara uluslararası toplumun sürdürülüp terakki ettirilmesinde daha özel bir rol biçer.

Güçler dengesi kurumu büyük güçlerin karşısındakilerin mahalli olarak bağımsızlık ve mevcudiyetlerini korumalarına da vesile olur. Bölgesel büyük güçlere karşı ittifak ederek küçük güçler bağımsızlık ve mevcudiyetlerini korurlar. Öte yandan bölgesel güçler, küçük ya da büyük, başka bölgesel güçlere karşı müttefik olmak ihtiyacı hissedebileceğinden kendi aralarındaki çatışma da dengelenip azalır.

Her ne kadar savaşı uluslararası toplumu düzenleyici ve sürdürücü bir kurum olarak addetse de Bull, uluslararası hukukun savaşın yöntem ve şiddetini denetleyip kısıtlayıcı bir vazife görmesi dolayısıyla çok önemli olduğunu belirtir. Savaşın haddini aşarak uluslararası toplumu yok etmesine müsaade etmemek uluslararası hukukun

işlevlerinin başlıcasıdır. Fakat başka bir taraftan uluslararası hukukun dayandığı prensip ve ideallerin tarih boyunca savaşlar yoluyla terakki etmesi de söz konusudur. Bu da savaş ve uluslararası toplum arasındaki mütekabil ilişkiye delalettir.

Diplomasi kurumu bizzat varlığı ve faaliyeti ile uluslararası toplumun şiarıdır. Uzun süreden beri çatışmalarla ve anlaşmalarla döşenmiş bir geçmişin ürünü olması dolayısıyla bir çok uluslararası teamülün neşet ve idame ettiği mecradır. Uluslararası toplumdaki sorunların çözümünde gayri-çatışmacı yöntemleri temin eder. Sürtüşmeleri daha ciddi çatışmalara yol açmadan bertaraf ederek uluslararası toplumu çatışmadan uzak tutar.

Bu çalışma da bu söz konusu unsurların kurumluklarını inceleyip İngiliz Ekolü'nün uluslararası toplum kavramındaki yerini açıklamaya kalkışmaktadır. İngiliz ekolünün uluslararası toplumda faal gördüğü kurumlar ve bunların ortaya çıkıp sürdürülmesi ele alınmakta, incelenmekte ve diğer uluslararası toplum kavramlarının, bilhassa liberal kavramın, kurumlarından farklılıkları ortaya konmaya çalışılmaktadır. İngiliz Ekolü için kurumlar hem tarihsel ilişkilere hem de diplomasi merkezinde şekillenmiş bir kültüre dayanmaktadır.

Uluslararası sistem ve toplum arasındaki farklılığın temel noktalarında biri kültür meselesidir. Bu meseleyi tartışmak İngiliz Ekolü'nün uluslararası toplumda kültürel bir taraf gördüğünü göstermek açısından da önemlidir. Watson 19. Yüzyıl Avrupa devletler toplumuna Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun dahil sayılıp sayılmaması hususunu tartışır. Osmanlılar ile Avrupalılar arasındaki derin kültürel farklılık böyle bir dahilliğin söz konusu olmadığı iddialarını dile getirir. Fakat Watson uluslararası toplumun kültürel veçhesinin merkezinde diplomatik kültürü görmektedir. Ona göre 19.yüzyıl devletler toplumu Avrupa kültüründe inkişaf etmiş olsa da bunun neticesinde oluşan diplomatik kültürün benimsenmesiyle başka bir kültüre sahip olan

Osmanlı İmparatorluğu da pekala bu devletler toplumunun bir üyesi sayılabilir. Ehemmiyetli olan taraf ortak bir diplomatik kültürün benimsenmiş olmasıdır.

Wight'ın realizm, devrimcilik ve rasyonalizm adını verdiği üç geleneğe karşılık olarak bu çalışma sırasıyla Realizm, Liberalizm ve İngiliz Ekolünü incelemiştir. Wight bu gelenekler arasındaki farklı özetlerken tabiat hali telakkilerinin örneklik teşkil edebileceğini söyler. Realistlere göre tabiat hali acımasız, zalim ve herhangi bir sosyal düzen halinden tamamen ayırılır. Devrimciler ise gör ardı ederler ve insan ilişkilerinin gelişiminde akıl ve gayret yoluyla derhal aşılması, ortadan kaldırılması ve geride bırakılması gereken bir adım olarak görürler. Rasyonalistler ise tabiat hali kavramını devrimcilerin aksine önemserler fakat gerekçeleri realistlerinkinden farklıdır. Şiddet kullanıp mücadele edilerek uyum sağlanması gereken bir halden ziyade toplumsallığın tohumunun atıldığı bir başlangıç noktasıdır.

5.SONUÇ

Realizm'de uluslararası toplum bir boş-kavram olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Hobbes, tabiat halini kavramlaştırışı ve sözleşme teorisini kuruşu ile devletler üstü bir toplumsal yapının kurulamayacağını ileri sürmüş olmaktadır. Waltz da uluslararası anarşinin dünya siyasetindeki çatışmacı atmosferin temelinde yattığını ve onun izâlesi olmaksızın sosyal düzen veya benzeri bir şeyin tesis edilemeyeceğini ileri sürmektedir. Realist düşüncesinin temel izleklerinden biri olarak çatışma ve sosyal düzen arasında mutlak bir tezat varsayımı görülmektedir. Egemenin veya merkezi bir idarenin olduğu bölgede düzen, olmadığı yerde karmaşa görmek gibi bir ikilik söz konusudur. Bu ikilik söz konusu olduğundaysa realistler devletlerin varlıklarını ve güvenliklerini idameyi tercih ederek çatışmacı bir yol seçeceklerini öngörür.

Liberalizm için de benzer bir ikilik mevcuttur. Çatışma ve düzen bir arada alımlanamaz. Fakat bu ikilik karşısında liberaller devletlere bencil bir reçete

vermektense mevcut durumun kendi başına bir mahiyet arz etmediğini, daha barışçıl ve düzensiz bir yapılanmanın tesisi için gayret gösterilmesi gerektiğini ileri sürerler. Kant'ta bu görülmektedir. Devletler üstü bir federatif yapının kurulmasını öneren Kant için devletler de bireyler gibi ahlaki sorumluluklara sahiptir ve bunun temelini ebedi barışı tesis etme ödevi teşkil eder. Bu yolda ticaret savaşa zıtlık oluşturmak bakımından sosyalleştirici bir işlev görürken diğer gereken kurumların tesisi için de zemin hazırlar. Kant'ın uluslararası toplumu işlevsel ve kurumsal biçimde kavramlaştırdığı söylenebilir.

Rawls liberal ve demokrat kurumların neticesi olarak ortaya çıkmış bir uluslar hukukundan bahseder. Fakat Rawls'ta da işlevsel tarafı görmek mümkündür. Öngördüğü uluslararası toplum liberal-demokrat kurumlara sahip devletlerin teşkil ettiği bir yapı olsa da bu kurumlara sahip olmayan ama insan hakları ve uluslararası barışçılık gibi hususiyetlere sahip kurumlarla işleyen başka devletlerde bilahare bu uluslar hukukuna dahil olabilirler. Mühim nokta şudur ki Rawls için bu kurumlar belli başlı işlevleri görmeleri hasebiyle uluslararası topluma girmeye uygundur. Beitz için de uluslararası toplumun temelini oluşturacak adalet düşüncesi belli bir işlevi görmesi hasebiyle ehemmiyet arz eder. Toplumsallığın neticesi olarak ortaya çıkan mahsus bir kolektif faaliyeti sürdürmek gereği mevcut toplumsallığın meşruiyetini temellendirir.

Nihayet İngiliz ekolü uluslararası toplum kavramını tarih boyunca geliştirilen kurum ve teamüller üzerine kurar. Diplomatik kültür birleştirici bir unsur olarak oldukça önemlidir. İngilizce Ekolü çatışma ve düzeni beraberce alımlamaktan geri durmaz. Onlara göre savaş devletler arası teması ve dolayısıyla ilerleyen merhalelerde teamüllerin gelişimini hazırlayan bir tohum görevi görür. Watson örnek olarak Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Avrupa devletler toplumunu verir.

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